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Abstract
This dissertation is comprised of three essays, the first two of which are coauthored
with Kevin R. Williams. In the first chapter, we develop new empirical methodology
to estimate consumer demand and across-market consumer demand heterogeneity when
faced with products that have zero sales at the local market level, but have positive sales
at the aggregate (national) market level. The absence of sales is a common problem
among data sets with a large number of products and this problem is exacerbated when
markets are narrowly defined. Observing zero sales creates two major empirical issues.
First, standard estimation techniques rely on the Law of Large Numbers in sales. When
the Law of Large Numbers does not apply, mechanically forcing the estimation will
result in biased demand estimates. Second, failing to account for small sample sizes
may create spurious heterogeneity. That is, the randomness generated by small sample
sizes may overstate the degree to which demand differs across locations. Alternatively,
aggregating over markets to obtain a large sample size will obscure the heterogeneity
across local markets. We propose a modification to Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn,
Pakes (1995), where both local and aggregate level sales information are used to recover
geographically varying demand. This new estimation approach is easy to implement
and we will show, using Monte Carlos exercises, that it fits the data well.
In the second chapter, we apply this new methodology to examine the welfare benefit
of the increased access to variety from online retail. The proliferation of online retail
has greatly increased consumers’ access to variety. The value of this additional variety
depends crucially on the extent to which local demand can be captured by local retailers.
The existing literature has found huge welfare benefits from online variety, but these
studies have been limited by national level data. As a result, they are unable to speak
to the differences in demand across locations. Using an original data set of online
shoe sales, we show that failing to account for across-market heterogeneity can greatly
overstate the consumer welfare gain from increases in product variety.
In the third chapter, I develop a theory of non-collusive basing-point pricing under
Bertrand competition. Basing-point pricing occurs when the delivered prices faced by a
consumer is determined by the consumer’s distance from a common location, known as
iii
the basing point. That is, the price faced by the consumer is equal to the price charged
by firms at the basing point plus the cost of transportation from the basing point to the
consumer’s location regardless of the actual location of the selling firm. The existing
non-collusive theories of basing-point pricing rely on the exploitation of market power
by non-basing point firms to obtain the basing-point result. I show that basing-point
pricing is consistent with Bertrand competition by non-basing point firms when these
firms face increasing marginal costs of production or capacity constraints.
iv
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Chapter 1
Estimating Across-Market
Demand Heterogeneity in
Discrete Choice Models with a
Sparsity of Local Sales
1.1 Introduction
Modern techniques for estimating differentiated product demand systems (discrete choice),
such as Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), have been developed to
back out demand parameters from aggregate level data. While extensions to this lit-
erature have allowed for the incorporation of micro-level data, the underlying theory
behind these models assumes the existence of a continuum of consumers, resulting in
every product having a strictly positive probability of purchase. Empirical applica-
tions must then rely on data in which a large number of purchases are observed and
aggregated to compute a “market” share for each product. These market shares are
the empirical analogues of the theoretical purchase probabilities and, in the estimation,
market shares are assumed to be equal to the true underlying choice probabilities.
Unfortunately, real-world data are often not as pristine as the theory demands.
When the number of purchases are not sufficiently large, observed market shares will be
1
2poor estimates of the true underlying choice probabilities. This small samples problem
is most obvious when some products are observed with zero sales. These zeros are
problematic for standard demand estimation strategies because they create selection
bias in the estimates, resulting in demand elasticities that are biased toward zero (Berry,
Linton, and Pakes 2004, Gandhi, Lu, and Shi 2013, Gandhi, Lu, and Shi 2014), i.e.
consumers are estimated to be too inelastic. Gandhi, Lu, and Shi (2014) shows that the
biases can be quite severe even with a relatively small fraction of zeros in the data.
While zeros may have been a minor nuisance in the past, researchers are now fre-
quently encountering a large number of products with zero market shares in their data
due to technical advances in data collection and the increasing availability of extremely
detailed, disaggregated sales data. This places critical emphasis on the definition of
a market. Since increasing levels of aggregation will be less likely to exhibit a small
samples problem, researchers using this type of data are faced with a trade-off between
obtaining consistent demand estimates and performing analysis at narrow levels of dis-
aggregation.
This chapter focuses on situations in which researchers have geographically disag-
gregated sales data that exhibits a small sample problem at the “local” market (i.e.
city) level, but has a sufficiently large sample at the “aggregate” market (i.e. national)
level. Simply aggregating over local markets may not be satisfactory, however, because,
as highlighted in recent literature, many products face a high degree of heterogeneity
in demand across markets1 and aggregation would obscure these differences. Not only
is understanding this heterogeneity interesting in its own right, accounting for these
differences in demand may be important to correctly modeling substitution and welfare
effects at the aggregate level.
We propose a technique to obtain consistent estimates of the demand parameters,
while retaining information on the across-market demand heterogeneity. Unlike the
standard approaches, which would use the disaggregated local market shares directly
to identify a product-market level fixed effect, we instead use the local market share
1 For example, in a series of papers, Waldfogel finds evidence of differences in demand across
demographic groups in radio (Waldfogel 2003), television (Waldfogel 2004), and chain restaurants
(Waldfogel 2008). Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dube (2009) document a persistent early entry effect on a
brand’s market shares and perceived quality with stronger effects in markets geographically closer to a
brand’s city of origin. Finally, Bronnenberg, Dube, and Gentzkow (2012) find that brand preferences
can explain 40% of geographic variation in market shares.
3information to form a set of micro-moments that augment the aggregated sales data
(Petrin 2002). The differences in a product’s local market shares allow us to identify
the variance of product-market level random effects. In this way, we can allow for
estimated substitution patterns and welfare to reflect differences in the demand for
products across locations. The trade-off we make to obtain consistent demand estimates
is that our approach estimates the distribution of heterogeneity, rather than the exact
realization.
Our estimation strategy exploits the structure of the model to, in a sense, separate
the problem into two parts. At the aggregate level, our approach effectively mimics
the standard approach and we are able to pin down the mean parameters that are
common across all local markets. Separately, our micro-moments are used to estimate
the distribution of consumer heterogeneity across markets, while explicitly accounting
for small samples.2 If we failed to address the small samples, we would overstate
the degree of heterogeneity across markets. In an influential paper, Ellison and Glaeser
(1997) argue that with only a small number of establishments in an industry, naive
calculations will overstate the differences in suitability across locations for the industry.
The same point applies when evaluating differences in demand across locations, small
samples may lead to inferring a level of across-market demand heterogeneity that is
spurious. In the context of discrete choice demand models, the result will be to overstate
demand for products with observed sales. This, in turn, overstates the consumer welfare
generated by these products.3
After presenting the models and our estimation strategy, we perform a series of
Monte Carlo exercises to examine the performance of our estimation technique relative
to existing methodologies. We find that our estimation strategy fits the data well, ad-
dressing biases in the estimated demand parameters created by local level small sample
sizes, while retaining the across-market demand heterogeneity of interest. We also show
that retaining this heterogeneity across-markets is critical to computing estimates of
2 Given the number of observed purchases in each market, sampling from the distribution of consumer
tastes implies, for each product, a certain percentage of markets will have zero sales of that product.
Our estimation matches the percentage of zeros implied by simulating the model to the percentage of
zeros observed in the data (our micro-moments).
3 Note that taking seriously zero observed sales when the true choice probability is greater than zero
will artificially increase the choice probability of products with observed purchases. Thus, products with
observed purchases will have inflated mean utilities, and hence, consumer welfare will be overstated.
4consumer welfare. As expected, ignoring the small samples problem in the local sales
data will overstate consumer welfare by overstating the differences across markets. On
the other hand, aggregation will understate consumer welfare by obscuring the differ-
ences across markets.4
The rest of the chapter will be organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our simple
logit and nested logit models incorporating across-market demand heterogeneity and
Section 3 discusses the estimation of these models. In Section 4, we conduct a series
of Monte Carlo exercises to show that our estimation performs well. Finally, Section 5
concludes the chapter.
1.2 Model
Each consumer solves a discrete choice utility maximization problem: Consumer i ∈ I`
in location ` ∈ L will purchase a product j if and only if the utility derived from product
j is greater than the utility derived from any other product, ui`j ≥ ui`j′ , ∀j′ ∈ J ∪ {0}.
For a product j ∈ J ∪ {0}, the utility of a consumer i ∈ I` in location ` ∈ L is given by
ui`j = δj + νi`j
where δj is the mean utility of product j for the aggregate (national) population of con-
sumers and νi`j is a random utility component that is heterogeneous across consumers
and locations. This chapter considers two forms of the random utility component cor-
responding to the simple logit and nested logit discrete choice demand models.
1.2.1 Simple Logit
In our simple logit model, the random utility component can be decomposed into
νi`j = η`j + εi`j ,
where εi`j is drawn i.i.d. from a Type-1 extreme value distribution. These terms
decompose the heterogeneity in the random utility among consumers into an “across-
market” effect, η`j , and a “within-market” effect, εi`j . When η`j = 0 for all ` ∈ L, j ∈ J ,
4 Conversely, ignoring small samples will understate gains to variety, while obscuring across market
heterogeneity will overstate gains to variety.
5then the model reduces to a standard “love of variety” logit model, where there is no
distinction between local and aggregate level preferences. That is, all heterogeneity is
within-market heterogeneity, which is identical across locations.
For any fixed location ` ∈ L, characterized by η` = {η`j}Jj=1, we can integrate out
over the within-market heterogeneity, εi`j . Since εi`j is distributed Type-1 extreme
value, integrating over them forms location-specific consumer choice probabilities,
pi`j = pij(η`; δ) =
exp{δj + η`j}∑J
j′=0 exp{δj′ + η`j′}
.
We then aggregate the location-specific choice probabilities to the national level using
the distribution of consumers across locations
pij =
∫
L
pij(η`; δ)dFω =
L∑
`=1
ω`pij(η`; δ),
where dFω is the density of location population shares and, in discrete notation, ω` is
the population share of location `.
1.2.2 Nested Logit
In the nested logit model, products are categorized (or grouped) into mutually exclusive
and exhaustive sets c ∈ C ∪ {0}.5 The random utility component can be decomposed
into
νi`j = η`c + η`j + ζic + (1− λ)εi`j
where η`c is a location-category fixed effect, εi`j is drawn i.i.d. from a Type-1 extreme
value distribution and ζic has the unique distribution such that [ζic + (1 − λ)εi`j ] has
a Type-1 extreme value distribution. For a consumer i, ζic is common to all products
in the same category and has a distribution that depends on the nesting parameter λ,
0 ≤ λ < 1. λ determines the within-category correlation of utilities. When λ → 1
consumers will only substitute to products within the same group and when λ = 0 the
model simplifies to the simple logit case. As in the simple logit model, these terms
decompose the heterogeneity in the random utility among consumers into an “across-
market” effect, η`c + η`j , and a “within-market” effect, [ζic + (1 − λ)εi`j ]. When η`c =
5 Our methodology can be extended to an arbitrary number of subnests. For details see Appendix
A.1.
6η`j = 0 for all ` ∈ L, c ∈ C, j ∈ J , then the model reduces to a standard nested logit
model, where there is no distinction between local and aggregate level preferences.
For any fixed location ` ∈ L, characterized by η` =
{
{η`c}Cc=1, {η`j}Jj=1
}
, we can
integrate out over the within-market heterogeneity, εi`j . Since [ζic + (1− λ)εi`j ] is dis-
tributed Type-1 extreme value, integrating over them forms location-specific consumer
choice probabilities,
pi`j = pij(η`; δ, λ) =
(∑
j∈c exp{δ`j/(1− λ)}
)1−λ
1 +
∑
c′∈C
(∑
j′∈c′ exp{δ`j′/(1− λ)}
)1−λ · exp{δ`j/(1− λ)}∑
j′∈c exp{δ`j′/(1− λ)}
,
where
δ`j = δj + η`c + η`j .
We then aggregate the location-specific choice probabilities to the national level using
the distribution of consumers across locations
pij =
∫
L
pij(η`; δ, λ)dFω =
L∑
`=1
ω`pij(η`; δ, λ),
where dFω is the density of location population shares and, in discrete notation, ω` is
the population share of location `.
The key difficulty in both setups is that the exact location-specific effects η`j cannot
be recovered from the sales data because of the sparsity of sales within disaggregated
locations. To circumvent this problem, we use a random-effects specification, where η`j
is drawn independently from a normal distribution, N(0, σ2j ). The relative importance
of the across-market component is then determined by σ2j . In the next section, we
outline a procedure that incorporates micro-moments – moments generated from the
disaggregated local shares – to estimate the distribution of η`j . This allows us to inte-
grate out (or aggregate) over η`j and obtain δj . We can then use traditional estimation
techniques to back out the parameters in δj . Crucially, our procedure accounts for the
fact that local market share observations suffer from small samples.
71.3 Estimation
Suppose we knew, or had an estimate for, σ = {σj}Jj=1. Then by simulating η˜`j ∼
N(0, σ2j ), we can exploit the structure of the model. By law of large numbers,
pij ≈

∑L
`=1 ω`pij(η˜`; δ) Simple Logit∑L
`=1 ω`pij(η˜`; δ, λ) Nested Logit
,
so long as the number of locations L is sufficiently large. Thus, aggregated choice
probabilities only depend on the variance of the across-market heterogeneity, σ, rather
than on than the individual fixed effects, η`, themselves. Therefore, aggregate level
demand can be expressed as
pij =
pij(δ;σ), j = 1, ..., J, Simple Logitpij(δ, λ;σ), j = 1, ..., J, Nested Logit ,
which is a system of equations that can, in general, be inverted (Berry, Gandhi, and
Haile 2013) to yield,
δ(pi, σ, λ) = xjβ − αpj + ξj ,
where xj is a vector of product characteristics, pj is the price of product j, and ξj is
the unobserved product quality for product j.
Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), for a fixed σ, we can use linear in-
strumental variables zj , such that E[zjξj ] = 0 and E[z′j(pj , xj)] has full rank, to identify
(α, β) as a function of σ. However, the existing instruments used in the literature6 typ-
ically provide little to no identifying power for the non-linear parameter σ (Gandhi and
Houde 2014). Instead we use the disaggregated information in our data to augment the
instrumental variable conditions with an additional set of micro-moments that provide
direct information on σ (Petrin 2002).
6 For example, BLP instruments
81.3.1 Micro-Moments
Let P0`j(σ) be the probability that a product j has zero sales given N` purchases are
observed in location `. We then define,
P0j(σ) =
1
L
L∑
`=1
P0`j(σ)
to be the fraction of markets that the model predicts will have zero sales for product
j. Observe that this fraction depends on model parameters, where we have implicitly
concentrated out δ as δ(pi, σ) or δ(pi, σ, λ) for simple logit and nested logit, respectively.
The empirical analogue is
Pˆ0j =
1
L
L∑
`=1
1{s`j = 0},
where s`j is the observed location level market share for product j. Our micro-moments
then identify σ by matching the model’s prediction to the empirical analogue, i.e.
m(σ) =
1
J
J∑
j=1
(
P0j(σ)− Pˆ0j
)
. (1.1)
Having laid the foundation of our estimation, the remaining subsections will discuss
the computational mechanics. We begin by showing that our inverted market shares
take a convenient analytical form. We then show how we use this structure and the
micro-moments to estimate the distribution of across-market heterogeneity, σ. Finally,
we discuss the identification of our parameters.
1.3.2 Inverting the Market Share
In this subsection, we show that the inverse of our market shares takes a convenient
analytical form, which will simplify the simulation of our local choice probabilities.
While small sample sizes make the observed local market shares unreliable estimates of
the underlying choice probabilities for individual products, we assume the local choice
probability of the outside good, pi`0, and the local choice probabilities of each category,
in the nested logit case, pi`c, are well estimated by the data. We present our market
share inversions in the following two propositions:
9Proposition 1 (Simple Logit). For any set of {η`}L`=1, the market share inversion takes
the following analytic form, ∀j ∈ J ,
δj = log pij − log
L∑
`=1
ω`pi`0 exp{η`j}. (1.2)
Proof. We will find it convenient to write shares as a fraction of the inside good. By
Bayes rule
pij(η`; δ) = Pr`{ J } · Pr`{ j | J }
= (1− pi`0) exp{δj + η`j}∑J
j′=1 exp{δj′ + η`j′}
Aggregated choice probabilities are then
pij =
L∑
`=1
ω`pij(η`; δ) =
L∑
`=1
ω`(1− pi`0) exp{δj + η`j}∑J
j′=1 exp{δj′ + η`j′}
.
Next, define
D` =
J∑
j′=1
exp{δj′ + η`j′},
so that pij =
∑L
`=1 ω`(1− pi`0) exp{δj+η`j}D` . We normalize the utility of the outside good
– both in terms of product characteristics, as well as, the unobserved taste preference
across locations. This means the probability of choosing the outside good at location `
is equal to
pi`0 =
exp(0)
exp(0) +D`
=
1
1 +D`
.
Rewriting the equation above, in terms of D`, implies D` = 1−pi`0pi`0 . This expression can
be substituted into the aggregate share for each inside good j, so that
pij =
L∑
`=1
ω`(1− pi`0) exp{δj + η`j}
D`
= exp{δj}
L∑
`=1
ω`pi`0 exp{η`j}.
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Finally, taking logs, we then have
log pij = δj + log
L∑
`=1
ω`pi`0 exp{η`j}
or
δj = log pij − log
L∑
`=1
ω`pi`0 exp{η`j}.

Proposition 2 (Nested Logit). For any set of {η`}L`=1, the market share inversion takes
the following analytic form, ∀j ∈ J ,
δj = (1− λ)
(
log (pij)− log
(∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c
(
pi`0
pi`c
) 1
1−λ
exp
{
η`j
1− λ
}))
. (1.3)
Proof. In the nested logit case, we will find it convenient to write shares as a fraction
of the category share. By Bayes rule
pij(η`; δ, λ) = Pr`{ c } · Pr`{ j | c }
= pi`c · exp{(δj + η`c + η`j)/(1− λ)}∑
j′∈c exp{(δj′ + η`c + η`j′)/(1− λ)}
= pi`c · exp{η`c/(1− λ)} exp{(δj + η`j)/(1− λ)}exp{η`c/(1− λ)}
∑
j′∈c exp{(δj′ + η`j′)/(1− λ)}
= pi`c · exp{(δj + η`j)/(1− λ)}∑
j′∈c exp{(δj′ + η`j′)/(1− λ)}
,
Aggregated choice probabilities are then
pij =
L∑
`=1
ω`pij(η`; δ, λ) =
L∑
`=1
ω`pi`c
exp{(δj + η`j)/(1− λ)}∑
j′∈c exp{(δj′ + η`j′)/(1− λ)}
.
Next, define
D`c =
∑
j′∈c
exp
{
δj + η`j
1− λ
}
.
We normalize the utility of the outside good – both in terms of product characteristics,
as well as, the unobserved taste preference across locations. This means the probability
of choosing the outside good at location ` is equal to
pi`0 =
1
1 +
∑
c′∈C D
1−λ
`c′
,
11
and note that the probability of choosing a good in category c at location ` is equal to
pi`c =
D1−λ`c
1 +
∑
c′∈C D
1−λ
`c′
,
thus
D`c =
(
pi`c
pi`0
) 1
1−λ
.
Plugging into the aggregate choice probabilities, gives
pij =
∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c
(
pi`0
pi`c
) 1
1−λ
exp
{
δj + η`j
1− λ
}
= exp
{
δj
1− λ
}∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c
(
pi`0
pi`c
) 1
1−λ
exp
{
η`j
1− λ
}
Finally, taking logs we have our inversion:
log (pij) =
δj
1− λ + log
(∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c
(
pi`0
pi`c
) 1
1−λ
exp
{
η`j
1− λ
})
or
δj = (1− λ)
(
log (pij)− log
(∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c
(
pi`0
pi`c
) 1
1−λ
exp
{
η`j
1− λ
}))

Since the population shares, ω`, the outside good shares, pi`0, and, in the case of
nested logit, the category shares, pi`c are assumed to be known, the inversions relate δj
to the aggregated share data, pij . Additionally, notice that this reduces to the standard
Berry (1994) simple and nested logit inversions when η`j = 0 for all ` ∈ L, j ∈ J . In
the next subsection, we describe how to estimate the distribution of heterogeneity using
our micro-moments. We can then integrate out this distribution to obtain the mean
utilities, δj , from the data, pij , and proceed with traditional estimation techniques at
the aggregate level.
1.3.3 Estimation Procedure
Local level mean utilities can be written as
δj + η`j = δj + σj η¯`j
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where η¯`j is an i.i.d. draw from a standard normal distribution. For any σ, simulated
local choice probabilities are given by
pˆi`j =

(1− pi`0) δj+σj η¯`jPJ
j′=1 δj′+σj′ η¯`j′
Simple Logit
pi`c
exp{(δj+σj η¯`j)/(1−λ)}P
j′∈c exp{(δj′+σj′ η¯`j′ )/(1−λ)} Nested Logit
.
The local level choice probabilities are then used to simulate consumer purchases at
each location, holding the number of observed purchases, N`, fixed. In particular, the
probability a product is observed to have zero sales in location ` is
P0`j(σ) = (1− pˆi`j)N` ,
i.e. the probability we observe N` sales at location `, none of which are of good j. This
explicitly accounts for the small sample sizes at the location level. We then estimate σˆ
such that it minimizes m(σ) (Equation 1.1).
After obtaining σˆ, the structure we have placed on the η`j ’s allows us to integrate
them out by subtracting the sum of local level random effects according to Equations
1.2 and 1.3, for simple and nested logit, respectively.7 Also note that, in the nested
logit case, fixing pi`c allows us to difference out the effect of the location level category
fixed effect, η`c.8 We then estimate
δj(pi, σˆ) = xjβ − αpj + ξj ,
using standard instrumental variables methods to control for price endogeneity.
Identifying the Nesting Parameter
Nested logit provides the additional complication of identifying the nesting parameter,
λ. In the Berry (1994) nested logit inversion, within category shares are correlated with
the unobserved product quality creating an endogeneity problem. A similar issue arises
in our inversion. Note that, with δ as defined in Equation 1.3,
E
[
∂δj(pi, σ, λ)
∂λ
· ξj
]
6= 0
7 Since we take many draws over the distribution of η`j , we can estimate (simulate to integrate) the
summations in Equations 1.2 and 1.3 without explicitly knowing each individual η`j
8 This is akin to the demeaning (or within transformation) approach to fixed effects.
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because ξj enters the aggregate product share, pij , and the local level category shares,
pi`c. Berry (1994) solves this problem by employing an instrument, zj|c, that is correlated
with the within category share, but uncorrelated with the unobserved product quality.9
The same instrument can be employed here, since zj|c is correlated
∂δj(pi,σ,λ)
∂λ through the
local level category shares, but still uncorrelated with the unobserved product quality.
Thus, if zj|c is a valid and relevant instrument when estimating the nested logit model
using the Berry (1994) inversion, it is a valid and relevant instrument for our estimation.
1.3.4 Identification
The variance of our local level random effect, η`j , is identified through differences in
local market shares. Ideally, if there were no across-market demand heterogeneity, each
product’s local market shares would be the same in every market, and our variance
would be zero. However, differences in local market shares may arise due to sampling,
particularly in the presence of small sample sizes. Therefore in our construction of the
micro-moments we are careful to account for the number of sales in each market.
For each product, we will use the number of locations in which zero sales are ob-
served to form our micro-moments. To understand the intuition behind this, consider
a world with a single inside good. If demand is homogeneous across markets, at the
disaggregated level, we would expect to see similar market shares. In particular, if this
good is very popular at the aggregate level, we would expect to observe few, if any, local
markets with zero sales. Instead suppose we observe wildly different shares across mar-
kets with a significant portion of markets having zero sales. This suggests the product
faces heterogeneous demand across markets. Assuming a normal distribution, as we do,
the variance of this heterogeneity can then be pinned down by the number of observed
zeros. If a large number of zeros are observed, this suggests a large number of markets
drew low valuations for the good (a low draw of η`j), which suggests a higher variance
for the heterogeneity. This is because the higher the variance the greater the density of
low η`j draws. Conversely, few observed zeros suggests there are few markets with low
draws of η`j and, hence, a lower variance.
9 For example, a combination of the product characteristics of competing products within the same
category or nest.
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Parameters within δj are identified through the standard channels. In the cross-
section through variation in aggregate sales given characteristics, (xj , pj), and across
time periods through time varying characteristics and variation in the choice set J . For
the nested logit model, identification of the nesting parameter, λ, is driven by changes
to the category shares as the utilities of products within the category change or the
number of products within the category changes.
1.4 Monte Carlo Exercises
In this section, we conduct a series of Monte Carlo exercises to examine the performance
of our estimation procedure, where local market shares are used to estimate parame-
ters governing across-market heterogeneity and aggregate shares are used to estimate
parameters constant across markets. Parameters governing the across-market hetero-
geneity and mean aggregate demand are estimated jointly using Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM). For comparison, we also present the results for the estimation using
the Berry (1994) inversions on local and aggregate level data.
1.4.1 Simple Logit
We start by assigning parameters and drawing consumer purchases from disaggregated
local shares. The true model has the form
ui`j = β0 + β1x1j + β2x2j + ξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj
+η`j + εi`j .
The outside good gives utility ui`0 = εi`0. We assign distributions on the data generating
process according to Table 1.1.
With the synthetic data, we have a a matrix of local shares across locations and
products, sLJ . Demand at each locality is obtained from simulating bω`Mc consumer
purchases (of J∪{0}) according to probabilities (s`J , 1−
∑
J s`j). Our estimation stacks
two sets of moments:
1. To identify the across-market heterogeneity, σ, the micro-moments we use are, for
each product, the percentage of local markets with zero sales implied by the model
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Table 1.1: Data generating process distributions (Simple Logit)
Variable Distribution
x1 N (0, 1)
x2 N (0, 1)
ξ N (0, 1)
η N (0, σ = 1)
ε T1EV
J 500
T 1
M 500000
L 100
ω` 1/L
and match this to the observed percentage of local markets in which a product
has zero sales:
E
[
P0j(σ)− Pˆ0j
]
= 0.
2. To identify the mean utility parameters within δ, we employ the standard linear
moments:
E[xjk(δj(σ)−Xβ)] = E[xjk · ξj ] = 0, for k = 0, 1, 2
where k indexes the independent variable.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 present the simple logit estimation results for our Monte Carlo
exercises. Table 1.2 compares the Berry inversion estimated using local market level
data to our estimator. Biased parameters are highlighted in bold. The intercept term,
β0, is adjusted to vary the percentage of products with local market shares equaling
zero. As we can see, the estimated parameters using local level data are all severely
attenuated toward zero with this bias being greater the greater the percentage of local
zeros. Meanwhile, our estimation technique fits quite well and is unaffected by the
percentage of local zeros.
Table 1.3 compares the Berry inversion estimated using aggregate level data to our
estimator. Here the across-market demand heterogeneity, σ, is varied and each of these
average about 81% local zeros. With the aggregate level data, the percentage of local
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Table 1.2: Monte Carlo - Varying Local Zeros (Simple Logit)
Berry Quan and Berry Quan and Berry Quan and
True Loc. Williams Loc. Williams Loc. Williams
Value β0 = −5.5 β0 = −8.25 β0 = −11
β0 -4.787 -5.506 -7.103 -8.25 -8.224 -11.078
(0.066) (0.050) (0.038) (0.043) (0.024) (0.063)
β1 -1 -0.595 -0.994 -0.479 -1.005 -0.236 -1.064
(0.029) (0.042) (0.033) (0.043) (0.037) (0.055)
β2 0.5 0.297 0.499 0.247 0.512 0.120 0.523
(0.031) (0.047) (0.031) (0.047) (0.031) (0.056)
σ 1 0.997 0.989 0.986
(0.012) (0.011) (0.020)
Local Zeros 20% 46% 81%
For the Monte Carlo, we simulate 100 synthetic data sets and use the two sets of moments outlined
above. The intercept is varied to vary the percentage of local zeros. Bold font highlights biased
estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.
zeros has little effect on the demand estimates because, at the aggregate level, a large
sample of consumers is observed. However, the aggregated estimation obscures the
heterogeneity across markets, that is the across-market heterogeneity will be averaged
across markets. Since the heterogeneity across markets enters the share equations non-
linearly, averaging will result in a biased intercept term. The greater the across-market
demand heterogeneity the greater the bias in the estimated intercept.
In the following chapter, we examine the consumer welfare effects of increasing
product variety. Here, using the Monte Carlo exercises above, we examine the consumer
welfare estimates made by the preceding estimation techniques. Consider a world where
consumers are constrained to a subset of the most popular products in their local market
and index total consumer welfare to 1 when consumers have access to the universe of
products. Figure 1.1 compares the consumer welfare estimated using our technique
(vertical-dash) to the Berry inversion using national (dash) and local (dash-dot) sales
and to the true values (solid) implied by the model.
Ignoring the small samples sizes using local level data will overstate consumer welfare
by making local markets appear more different from each other than they are in reality.
In particular, products with zero observed sales in a local market are assumed to have
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Table 1.3: Monte Carlo - Varying Across-Market Heterogeneity (Simple Logit)
Berry Quan and Berry Quan and Berry Quan and
True Agg. Williams Agg. Williams Agg. Williams
Value σ = .5 σ = 1 σ = 1.5
β0 -11 -11.009 -11.125 -10.598 -11.078 -9.966 -11.054
(0.067) (0.068) (0.056) (0.063) (0.049) (0.058)
β1 -1 -1.067 -1.067 -1.065 -1.064 -1.052 -1.054
(0.068) (0.068) (0.055) (0.055) (0.063) (0.062)
β2 0.5 0.532 0.532 0.524 0.523 0.518 0.518
(0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.059) (0.06)
σ 0.484 0.986 1.497
(0.026) (0.02) (0.026)
For the Monte Carlo, we simulate 100 synthetic data sets and use the two sets of moments
outlined above. Across-market demand heterogeneity is varied. The local level data averages
about 81% zeros. Bold font highlights biased estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.
zero demand at that location. Thus, relatively few products in each location are then
required to satisfy local demand. On the other hand, failing to account for the across-
market demand heterogeneity will understate consumer welfare when demand is actually
correlated by location because, if tastes were equally distributed across locations, it
would require relatively more products to satisfy demand. Our technique, by properly
accounting for both the local small sample sizes and across-market heterogeneity, is able
to fit the true underlying consumer welfare.
1.4.2 Nested Logit
As in the simple logit case, we begin by assigning parameters and drawing consumer
purchases from disaggregated local shares. The true model has the form
ui`j = β0 + β1x1j + β2x2j + ξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
δj
+η`j + ζic + (1− λ)εi`j .
The outside good gives utility ui`0 = ζi0 + (1 − λ)εi`0. We assign distributions on the
data generating process according to Table 1.4.
Table 1.5 presents the nested logit estimation results for our Monte Carlo exercises.
The results mirror the simple logit results, so we condense them into one table here. The
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Figure 1.1: Consumer Welfare Estimates (Simple Logit)
Notes: Consumer welfare indexed to 1 when all products are available.
Berry inversion estimated using local market level data provides severely biased demand
estimates. With the large number of zeros, it has a great deal of trouble identifying the
nesting parameter resulting in a very noisy estimate, often exhibiting the wrong sign.
Using aggregate level data provides consistent estimates of all of the parameters except
for the intercept because of the nonlinear averaging of the across-market heterogeneity.
Again our proposed estimator performs well, while retaining the distribution of across-
market demand heterogeneity.
Figure 1.2 compares the consumer welfare estimates under the nested logit model.
As in the simple logit case, ignoring the small samples problem at the local level will
overstate consumer welfare (dash-dot), while failing to account to the across-market
demand heterogeneity will understate consumer welfare (dash). Again, our technique
(vertical-dash), by properly accounting for both the local small sample sizes and across-
market heterogeneity, is able to fit the true underlying consumer welfare (solid).
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Table 1.4: Data generating process distributions (Nested Logit)
Variable Distribution
x1 N (0, 1)
x2 N (0, 1)
ξ N (0, 1)
η N (0, σ = 1)
ε T1EV
J 750
C 15
T 15
M 500000
L 100
ω` 1/L
1.5 Conclusion
Researchers are increasingly faced with a trade-off between performing analysis at nar-
row levels of disaggregation and, due to small sample sizes at these disaggregated levels,
obtaining consistent demand estimates. This chapter focused on situations in which
researchers have geographically disaggregated sales data that exhibits a small sample
problem at the local market (i.e. city) level, but has a large sample at the aggregate
market (i.e. national) level.
We proposed an estimation technique to obtain consistent estimates, while retaining
the across-market demand heterogeneity, for two commonly used discrete choice models,
simple logit and nested logit.10 Instead of using disaggregated local market shares
directly, we use the local sales information to form a set of micro-moments to augment
the aggregated sales data. Our estimation strategy exploits the structure of the model
to separate the problem into two parts. At the aggregate level, our approach effectively
mimics the standard approach and we are able to pin down the mean parameters that
are common across all markets. Separately, our micro-moments are used to estimate
the distribution of consumer heterogeneity across markets, while explicitly accounting
for small samples.
10 Future work will seek to extend this methodology further to the full random coefficients model.
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Table 1.5: Monte Carlo Demand Results (Nested Logit)
Berry Quan and
Local Aggregate Williams
Parameter True Value (1) (2) (3)
β0 -4 -5.807 -3.017 -4.125
(1.331) (0.475) (0.704)
β1 -1 -0.719 -1.073 -1.118
(0.040) (0.143) (0.169)
β2 0.5 0.358 0.535 0.557
(0.016) (0.072) (0.084)
λ 0.5 -0.490 0.519 0.498
(0.488) (0.066) (0.079)
σ 1 — — 1.070
(0.214)
For the Monte Carlo, we simulate 100 synthetic data sets and use the
two sets of moments outlined above. The local level data averages about
71% zeros. Bold font highlights biased estimates. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Finally, using a series of Monte Carlo exercises, we provided evidence that our esti-
mation strategy fits the data well and highlight the importance of accounting for both
local level small sample sizes and the across-market demand heterogeneity. Ignoring
the small samples problem in the local sales data will overstate the heterogeneity in
demand across markets leading to an overstatement of consumer welfare, while fail-
ing to account for differences across markets by aggregating over them will understate
consumer welfare.
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Figure 1.2: Consumer Welfare Estimates (Nested Logit)
Notes: Consumer welfare indexed to 1 when all products are available.
Chapter 2
Product Variety, Across-Market
Demand Heterogeneity, and the
Value of Online Retail
2.1 Introduction
There is widespread recognition that as economies have advanced, consumers have ben-
efited from an increasing access to variety. Several strands of the economics literature
have examined the value of new products and increases in variety either theoretically
or empirically, e.g. in trade (Krugman 1979), macroeconomics (Romer 1994), and in-
dustrial organization (Lancaster 1966, Dixit and Stiglitz 1977). The internet has given
consumers access to an astonishing level of variety. Consider shoe retail. A large tradi-
tional brick-and-mortar shoe retailer offers at most a few thousand distinct varieties of
shoes. However, as we will see, an online retailer may offer over 50,000 distinct varieties.
How does such dramatic increases in variety contribute to welfare?
The central idea of this chapter is that gains from online retail depend critically
on the extent to which demand varies across geography and the response of traditional
brick-and-mortar stores to local tastes (Waldfogel 2010). For example, the addition of
5,000 different kinds of winter boots online will be of little value to consumers living
in Florida just as the addition of 5,000 different kinds of sandals online will be of little
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consequence to consumers in Alaska. If Alaskan retailers offer a large selection of boots
that capture the majority of local demand, only consumers with niche tastes – possibly
those who want sandals – will benefit from the variety offered by online retail. Therefore,
in order to quantify the gains from variety due to online retail, it is critical to estimate
the extent to which demand varies across regions.
We have collected an extremely detailed data set consisting of point-of-sale, product
review, and inventory data from a large online retailer. One of the product categories
the retailer sells is footwear, from which, we observe over 13.5 million shoe sales across
more than 100,000 products. For each sale, we observe the date and time, shipping
destination, price, and a wealth of information about the shoe. The richness of the
data allows us define products and geographies at very narrow levels. For example,
we are able to differentiate between the different colors of the same model of shoe and
we can attribute sales to particular metro-areas. In addition, we collected data on
shoe assortments across stores for a few large retail chains. This data provides us with
direct evidence that firms are responding to across-market heterogeneity, as product
assortments vary significantly across stores.1
Using our transactions data, we document large differences in demand for specific
products across geographic markets. Since prices, product characteristics, and choice
sets are the same for all geographic markets, these differences can only be rationalized
by differences in local demand. To highlight the extent of these differences, consider the
top 1,000 products at the metro level. On average, these products make up 87% of a
metro area’s total sales. Now consider the national sales of these same 1,000 products.
These products only make up 12% of total national sales. These large differences suggest
that even among top products, demand varies significantly across locations. To formally
test for differences across markets, we use simple multinomial tests that compare local
market shares to national market shares. These tests overwhelmingly reject the null
hypothesis that consumers across markets have the same demand over shoes.
1 Macy’s, in particular, has made a concerted effort to localize product assortments. This is reflected
in our data and emphasized in the following quote: “We continued to refine and improve the My Macy’s
process for localizing merchandise assortments by store location, as well as to maximize the effectiveness
and efficiency of the extraordinary talent in our My Macy’s field and central organization. We have
re-doubled the emphasis on precision in merchandise size, fit, fabric weight, style and color preferences
by store, market and climate zone. In addition, we are better understanding and serving the specific
needs of multicultural consumers who represent an increasingly large proportion of our customers.”
https://www.macysinc.com/macys/m.o.m.-strategies/default.aspx
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After showing that the data is inconsistent with a model devoid of across-market
demand heterogeneity, we turn to estimating the gains from online variety. Our model-
ing approach, outlined in Chapter 1, closely follows the discrete choice literature with
an emphasis on allowing tastes to vary across locations. The importance of flexibly
modeling heterogeneity in discrete choice setups has been well documented in the liter-
ature (see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Petrin (2002), Song (2007)). The model
allows for the fact that, for example, the removal of a popular sandal will be much more
costly for markets in Florida than for markets in Alaska. Failing to account for this
heterogeneity will place heavy dependence on the idiosyncratic logit error, resulting in
estimated welfare benefits of variety that are much too large.
Employing our data at the level of narrowly defined products and at narrow geo-
graphic detail, however, also presents us with an empirical challenge. Despite the fact
that we observe millions of sales, the large number of products and locations, inevitably
leads to many products having local market shares equal to zero. For example, even in
the annualized data 82.2% of products have zero sales at the metro level and 59.8% of
products have zero sales at the state level.2 As highlighted in Chapter 1, these zeros
are problematic for two reasons. First, using standard estimation techniques create a
selection bias in the demand estimates, leading to incorrect estimates of the gains to
variety. Second, the zeros suggests a small samples problem that, if uncorrected, would
lead us to overstate the degree of heterogeneity across markets and understate the gains
to variety.3
While we could further aggregate over either geography or product space to reduce
the percentage of zeros, this would be unsatisfactory because it would significantly ob-
scure the across-market heterogeneity of interest to us. Instead we address this problem
using the estimation technique proposed in Chapter 1. Our estimation strategy exploits
the structure of the demand model to, in a sense, separate the problem into two parts.
Using the local market share information to form a set of micro-moments that augment
2 Note that aggregation over the time horizon is also problematic because of the high turn over in
products. Conlon and Mortimer (2013) highlight that ignoring these changes to the choice set may bias
demand estimates.
3 For example, suppose on a particular day, a local market sees a single shoe sale and that is the
only sale of that particular shoe nationwide. If we fail to account for the small samples issue, we would
come to the conclusion that 1) the rest of the country has absolutely no interest in the product, and
2) that local market would not benefit from any additional variety because consumers only want that
particular shoe.
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the aggregated (national) sales data, which allows us to retain valuable information
on across-market demand heterogeneity while explicitly accounting for small samples.
Then at the aggregate level, our approach effectively mimics the standard approach
and we are able to pin down the price coefficient and other parameters common across
markets.
Since local choice sets are often unobserved, there is the additional challenge of fore-
casting local choice sets for counterfactual analysis. As mentioned above, brick-and-
mortar retailers tend to cater their assortments to local demand. Using our estimated
demand, we infer which products local brick-and-mortar retailers would be stocking in
the absence of online retail. Unfortunately, because of the number of products, the
combinatorial problem of choosing the most profitable assortment of items becomes in-
tractable. Consistent with the literature, we will assume local brick-and-mortar retailers
stock the top K most popular products. This is determined by the estimated local mean
utilities from the demand system. We can then calculate the consumer welfare in worlds
with and without the online retailer.
Our results indicate that demand for specific products varies significantly across mar-
kets and we show that accounting for this heterogeneity is necessary for rationalizing
the distribution of local sales. When brick-and-mortar retailers cater their assortments
to local demand, we find that the welfare gains from online variety are relatively small.
From 6.4 to 9.4% of the total unconstrained consumer welfare is due to online variety.
However, if we shut down the across-market demand heterogeneity, and hence the lo-
calization in brick-and-mortar retail, we would find 16.3 to 31.7% of the unconstrained
consumer welfare is due to online variety, an overstatement of between 187 and 338%.
Put another way, if local stores cater to local demand, then the value of online markets
is relatively small because the average consumer already has access to the products they
want to purchase. Additionally, for brick-and-mortar retailers, we find a large incentive
for them to cater to their local demand. By doing so they can obtain 14.5 to 28.8%
higher revenue than under a standardized assortment.
Finally, our results suggest a new interpretation of the “long tail” phenomenon
observed in online retail (Anderson 2004). The term describes a shift in the distribution
of revenue toward niche, or tail, products. The prevailing view is that the long tail
pattern has emerged because niche products better satisfy consumer tastes, leading
26
consumers to switch from purchasing hit products available at their local brick-and-
mortar retailers to purchasing niche products only available online.4 5 This suggests
sizable welfare gains by increasing variety. However, we find relatively smaller gains
from increasing the variety of shoes. This is due to the fact that in the presence of
across-market demand heterogeneity, aggregating demand across markets yields a long
tail nationally, but at the local level, the tails are relatively short which traditional
retailers can capture through localization of assortments.6
The rest of the chapter will be organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our data and
presents preliminary evidence of across-market heterogeneity. In Section 3, we present
the model. Section 4 discusses our estimation procedure to be followed by our demand
results in Section 5. Section 6, contains our counterfactual analysis. Section 7 discusses
the robustness of our findings and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2.2 Data
We create several original data sets for this study. The main data set consists of detailed
point-of-sale, product review, and inventory data that we collected from a large online
retailer. With this data, we observe over $1 billion worth of online shoe transactions
between 2012 and 2013. We augment this with a snapshot of shoe availability for two
brick-and-mortar retailers, Macy’s and Payless ShoeSource. A discussion of this data
can be found in Appendix B.1.
We begin by summarizing our data (Section 2.2.1), then we provide evidence of
4 A counterpoint can be found in Tan and Netessine (2009). They use individual level data on online
movie rentals and find no evidence that niche titles satisfy consumer tastes better than hit titles. Instead
niche consumption is driven by a small subset of heavy users. Additionally, they find a shortening effect
on the tail with the addition of new products. They conclude that this is due to new titles appearing
faster than consumers can discover them.
5 It has been suggested that these gains may be increasing over time as papers using multiple
years of data have found the long tail to be getting longer. (Chellappa, Konsynski, Sambamurthy, and
Shivendu 2007, Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith 2010).
6 To see this consider the following example: Suppose there are 100 equally sized markets, and each
prefers a different good. In each market, the local brick-and-mortar retailer sells one good that makes
up 100% sales (short tail). Now suppose an online retailer enters, which gives all 100 markets access
to all 100 products. Assuming an equal number of consumers from each market purchase online, the
online retailer will sell 100 goods that each make up 1% of sales (long tail). In this example the welfare
gain from access to variety would be zero, since all consumers were already being served their preferred
good by their local brick-and-mortar retailer.
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across-market consumer demand heterogeneity (Section 2.2.2). Finally, we document
the “zeros problem” in the data and discuss aggregation as a means to address the issue
(Section 2.2.3).
2.2.1 Online Shoe Sales
The main data for this study was collected and compiled with permission from a large
online retailer. This online retailer sells a wide variety of product categories, including
footwear, which will be the focus of our analysis. Each transaction in the point-of-sale
(POS) data base contains the timestamp of the sale, the 5-digit shipping zip code, price
paid, and a wealth of information about the shoe. Each sale corresponds to a stock-
keeping unit (SKU) and a numeric code for the style. The style code allows us to discern
red versus blue of the same shoe model. The transaction identifier allows us to see if a
customer purchased more than a single pair of shoes. For each product we record the
brand, product material, and many categorical classifying variables, such as if a shoe
is a wingtip and the material of the shoe. Finally, we download a picture of each shoe,
and image process them to create color covariates.
We also merge in product review and inventory data. The review data contains the
time series of reviews for each SKU. Each review contains reported ratings on comfort,
look, and overall appeal. For the inventory data, we track daily inventory for every
shoe.7 Importantly, this data allows us to infer the complete set of shoes in the
consumer’s choice set, even when the sale of a particular shoe is not observed.
We observe over 13.5 million shoe transactions during the collection period, with a
majority of transactions being women’s shoes. The price of shoes varies substantially
across gender, but also within gender – for example, dress shoes tend to be more expen-
sive than walking shoes. The distribution of transaction size per order is heavily skewed
to the left. Only a very small fraction of orders contain several pairs of shoes. Addi-
tionally, of the transactions containing multiple purchases, less than a quarter contain
the same shoe, suggesting concern over resellers is negligible in our data set. This also
implies there are few consumers buying multiple sizes of the same shoe in a single trans-
action. Overall, we believe this supports our decision to model consumers as solving a
7 Initially this data was not collected daily, but for the last seven months of data collection, each
shoe inventory was tracked daily.
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discrete choice problem.
We observe over 580,000 reviews. In addition to the review text, we also record the
consumer response to a few questions regarding the fit and look of the product. The
metrics we use are ratings for comfort, look, and overall appeal, where 1 is the lowest
rating, and 5 is the highest rating. The reviews are heavily skewed towards favorable
ratings, and we include this data in the demand system.
An important feature of the data is the number of products the online retailer offers.
The average daily assortment size is over 50,000 products, and over the span of data
collection, over 100,000 varieties of shoes were offered for sale. This constantly changing
choice set provides us with additional variation that will help us identify the parameters
of our model.
2.2.2 Across-Market Demand Heterogeneity
The premise of this paper is that there may exist significant differences in consumer
demand across geographic markets. If so, we would expect local retailers to cater their
inventory to their locality’s consumers. This may occur through some combination
of two avenues. First, while large national retailers take advantage of economies of
scale through standardization, more recently many national retailers are making a push
to regionally specialize their product assortments. Second, small local independent
retailers are likely to stock products based upon its local market’s demand in order to
compete with the larger retailers.
If our premise holds, then abstracting from heterogeneity in consumer demand across
markets will overestimate the value of the increase in consumers’ access to variety.
The extent of this overestimation will be driven by the degree of consumer demand
heterogeneity across markets, particularly for products that are highly ranked nationally.
We will remain agnostic about the source of heterogeneity across markets.
Since prices, product characteristics, and choice sets are the same for all markets,
differences in observed local market shares can only be rationalized by differences in
local demand. In Table 2.1, we present the average local and national share of revenue
generated by the top 1,000 products ranked by local market. If demand was homoge-
neous across markets, we would expect the share of revenue accruing to these products
to be the same locally and nationally. Thus, the two columns of Table 2.1 would be
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equal. Instead we see the share of revenue generated by these products are very large at
the local market level compared their share of revenue at the national level. For exam-
ple, the top 1,000 products ranked at the metro (combined statistical area - CSA) level
make up 86.9% of revenue at the metro level, but these same products only accounts for
11.5% of national revenue. This suggests that the commonality, even among the most
popular products, is quite small across markets.
Table 2.1: Revenue Share of Top 1,000 Products
Market Number of Market Top 1,000
Definition Markets Market National
Combined Statistical Area 165 86.9 11.5
State (plus DC) 51 55.4 19.5
Census Region 4 30.5 24.1
National 1 27.8 27.8
Local and national revenue share of the top products ranked by local mar-
ket for various levels of geographic aggregation. If demand was homoge-
neous across markets, revenue shares would be equal across columns.
We can formally test for across-market demand heterogeneity using multinomial
tests comparing local market shares (s`j) to national market shares (sj), where the null
hypothesis is H0 : s`j = sj , for all j ∈ J . Table 2.2 presents the rejection rates for
various levels of aggregation. We can see that these tests are overwhelmingly rejected
at all levels of aggregation. However, in the tests at the monthly level, we can see the
effects of both zeros and aggregation beginning to appear. At more disaggregated levels,
zeros become more prevalent, reducing the power of the multinomial tests. On the other
end of the spectrum, aggregating up to Census Regions greatly obscures heterogeneity
across markets leading to a reduction in rejection rates when compared to the Census
Division level.
Some differences across markets occur for obvious reasons. Take our earlier example
of boots versus sandals. Figure 2.1 plots the predicted values from a regression of a
state’s average annual temperature on the share of state revenue captured by boots
(dashed) and sandals (solid). As expected, boots make up a greater share of revenue in
colder states and a smaller share in warmer states. Conversely, the opposite relationship
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Table 2.2: Multinomial Tests - Rejection Rates
Census Census
CSA State Division Region
Month 80.1 89.1 97.6 92.9
Annual 89.3 1 1 1
Rejection rates for multinomial tests comparing local
market shares (s`j) to national market shares (sj).
The null hypothesis is H0 : s`j = sj , for all j ∈ J
holds for sandals.8
Figure 2.1: Boots vs. Sandals Revenue by Temperature
Other differences across markets occur for less obvious reasons. In Figure 2.2, we
map the consumption pattern of a popular brand, measured by national revenue. Annual
sales are mapped into 3 digit zip codes for the eastern United States.9 While this brand
tends to be popular over a large portion of the country, we can see a clear preference
8 This also demonstrates that consumers do not shop online just for products that are not available
in traditional brick-and-mortar stores. For example, boots – rather than sandals – make up a sizable
share of revenue in Alaska.
9 We isolate the eastern United States to be able to distinguish differences at fine levels of disag-
gregation and because the interesting portion of the map happens to be the northeastern part of the
country. The full map can be viewed in Appendix B.3 (Figure B.4).
31
for this brand in the northeast. In Florida this brand makes up less than 2.5% of sales,
while in parts of New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts it makes up over 6% of sales.
We will exploit this variation to help us identity across-market demand heterogeneity.
Figure 2.2: Sales Share of a Popular Brand Across Zip3s
2.2.3 Aggregation and the Zeros Problem
While demand varies across locations, the data at disaggregated levels exhibits a severe
small samples problem, which manifests itself in the form of a zeros problem. Table 2.3
illustrates the effect of disaggregating the data across both geography and time. For each
product, an observation is the number of sales by geographic area and time horizon. We
then calculate the percentage of observations where no sale is observed. For example, at
the CSA level 95% of products have zero monthly sales. This highlights a small samples
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problem that is common in high frequency sales data and data with large choice sets.
Observations of zero sales is problematic from both a theoretical and empirical point
of view. The distributional assumptions in many demand models imply no products will
have zero sales and empirical techniques often require taking the natural log of sales or
market shares. This, of course, does not exist when zero sales are observed and common
solutions to this problem will lead to biased demand estimates. An in-depth discussion
of these issues can be found in Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004), Gandhi, Lu, and Shi
(2013), and Gandhi, Lu, and Shi (2014).
Table 2.3: Data Disaggregation: The Zeros Problem
Avg. No. Percent with Zero Sales
of Products CSA State Region National
Month 62,768 95.0 85.3 23.3 12.3
Annual 117,493 82.2 59.8 5.7 1.2
Percent of products observed to have zero sales. An observation cor-
responds to sales at the time(rows)-geography(columns)-product level.
CSA: Combined Statistical Area. Region: U.S. Census Region.
On the other hand, aggregation can resolve some of the small samples issue, but
it is unsatisfactory because it significantly obscures across-market heterogeneity. For
example, we could further aggregate over geography to the Census Region, which would
reduce the percentage of zeros to 23.3%. However, this would also reduce the number
of markets to four and yet, the percentage of zeros is still quite high, and further
aggregation would be necessary. Furthermore, from Table 2.1, we can see that the top
1,000 products ranked at the Census Region level make up a similar share of revenue at
the market and the national levels. That is, we have greatly obscured the across-market
heterogeneity of interest to us.
We could also aggregate over product space. Table 2.4 shows the percentage of zeros
and the local and national revenue shares of the top products ranked by local market
for products at the SKU-style level (our definition of a product) and aggregated to the
SKU, brand-category, and brand levels. Since aggregating to the brand-category and
brand levels greatly reduces the number of products, we adjust the benchmark to the
top 10 “products,” rather than the top 1,000.
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Table 2.4: Revenue Share of Top Products: Product Aggregation
Product Percentage Market Top 1,000
Definition Zeros Market National
SKU-style 95 86.9 11.5
SKU 90 92.2 27.4
Market Top 10
Market National
Brand-Category 77 36.1 24.0
Brand 59 42.8 31.8
Time horizon fixed at monthly level and geography aggregated
to the CSA level. Level of aggregation is increasing from top to
bottom. This table illustrates how product aggregation lessens
burden of small sample sizes but obscures heterogeneity across
markets.
The table shows a clear trade-off: At increasing levels of aggregation, the zeros
problem is reduced, but this is at the expense of obscuring potential heterogeneity.
Similar to aggregation in geography, we see that additional aggregation is still necessary
to fully address the zeros problem. However, continued aggregation in either dimension
would only further obscure the heterogeneity in which we are interested. This motivates
the need to address small sample sizes in our analysis.
2.3 Model
This section presents our demand models for online shoes. We consider the simple and
nested logit specifications introduced in Chapter 1. A well known criticism of the simple
logit model is that it assumes consumer taste shocks are independent across the available
choices. In particular, it precludes consumers from having correlated preferences for
categories of shoes, such as boots over sandals. The advantage of the nested logit model
is that it allows these types of preferences by allowing consumer tastes to be correlated
within category nests.
The choice set of available shoes is the same across locations, which we will define
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to be CSA’s, but varies by time period, as some products enter and others exit each
period. Suppressing the time subscript, let J ∪ {0} be the set of available shoes with
{0} denoting the outside good. Shoes can also be categorized into mutually exclusive
and exhaustive sets c ∈ C ∪ {0}, where the outside good is contained in its own nest.
Categories of men’s shoes include boat, boots, clogs, oxfords, sandals, slippers, and
sneakers. Women’s shoes have two additional categories, flats and heels.
Each consumer solves a discrete choice utility maximization problem: Consumer
i ∈ I` in location ` ∈ L will purchase a shoe j if and only if the utility derived from shoe
j is greater than the utility derived from any other shoe, ui`j ≥ ui`j′ , ∀j′ ∈ J ∪ {0}. For
a shoe j ∈ J ∪ {0}, the utility of a consumer i ∈ I in location ` ∈ L is given by
ui`j = δj + νi`j
where δj is the mean utility of shoe j for the (national) population of consumers and νi`j
is a random utility component that is heterogeneous across consumers and locations.
We decompose the random utility component into
νi`j =
η`j + εi`j (Simple)η`c + η`j + ζic + (1− λ)εi`j (Nested) ,
where η`j is drawn independently from a normal distribution, N(0, σ2j ), η`c is a location-
category fixed effect, εi`j is drawn i.i.d. from a Type-1 extreme value distribution, and
ζic has the unique distribution such that [ζic + (1− λ)εi`j ] has a Type-1 extreme value
distribution. For a consumer i, ζic is common to all shoes in the same category and
has a distribution that depends on the nesting parameter λ, 0 ≤ λ < 1. λ determines
the within-category correlation of utilities. These terms decompose the heterogeneity
in the random utility among consumers into an “across-market” effect, η`j or η`c + η`j ,
and a “within-market” effect, εi`j or [ζic + (1 − λ)εi`j ]. When η`c = η`j = 0 for all
` ∈ L, c ∈ C, j ∈ J , then the model reduces to a standard “love of variety” simple or
nested logit model, where there is no distinction between local and national preferences.
For any fixed location ` ∈ L, characterized by η` = {η`j}Jj=1, we can integrate out
over the within-market heterogeneity, εi`j . Since εi`j is distributed T1EV, integrating
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over them forms location-specific consumer choice probabilities,
pi`j = pij(η`; δ) =

exp{δj+η`j}PJ
j′=0 exp{δj′+η`j′}
(Simple)
(
P
j∈c exp{δ`j/(1−λ)})
1−λ
1+
P
c′∈C(
P
j′∈c′ exp{δ`j′/(1−λ)})
1−λ · exp{δ`j/(1−λ)}P
j′∈c exp{δ`j′/(1−λ)} (Nested)
.
(2.1)
We then aggregate the location-specific choice probabilities to the national level using
the distribution of consumers across locations
pij =
∫
L
pij(η`; δ)dFω =
L∑
`=1
ω`pij(η`; δ),
where dFω is the density of location population shares and, in discrete notation, ω` is
the population share of location `.
2.4 Estimation
Since we have a large number of locations, 165 CSA’s, for any σ = {σj}Jj=1, we can
exploit the structure of the model by simulating η˜`j ∼ N(0, σ2j ) to approximate,
pij ≈
L∑
`=1
ω`pij(η˜`; δ).
With aggregated choice probabilities depending only on the variance of the across-
market heterogeneity, σ, national shoe demand can be expressed as
pij = pij(δ;σ), j = 1, ..., J.
Propositions 1 and 2 in Section 1.3.2, show how to invert this system of equations to
yield,
δ(pi, σ) = xjβ − αpj + ξj ,
where xj is a vector of shoe characteristics, pj is the price of shoe j, and ξj is the
unobserved product quality for shoe j. Included in x are ratings for comfort, look, and
overall appeal, as well as, fixed effects for color, brand, and time.
From Propositions 1 and 2, the market share inversions take the following form
δj =

log pij − log
∑L
`=1 ω`pi`0 exp{η˜`j} (Simple)
(1− λ)
(
log (pij)− log
(∑
`∈L ω`pi`c
(
pi`0
pi`c
) 1
1−λ exp
{
η˜`j
1−λ
}))
(Nested)
,
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where the shoe’s national market share, pij , location-specific population shares, ω`,
location-specific shares of the outside good, pi`0, and location-specific shares of each
shoe category, pi`c, are known from the data. Then, for a fixed σ and λ, we can use
linear instrumental variables zj , such that E[zjξj ] = 0 and E[z′j(pj , xj)] has full rank,
to identify (α, β) as a function of σ and λ.
We instrument for price using the characteristics of competing products (BLP in-
struments), grouped by brand. That is, let B denote the set of brands and let Jb denote
the set of shoes manufactured by brand b ∈ B, then, for each time period, our set of
price instruments is
xj ,
∑
j′ 6=j∈Jb
xj′ ,
∑
j′∈J−b
xj′ .
Additionally, we need a set of instruments to identify the nesting parameter, λ. For
this we use the characteristics of competing shoes by category. Let cb denote the set of
shoes manufactured by brand b ∈ B in category c ∈ C, then, for each time period, we
include the following additional instruments∑
j′ 6=j∈cb
xj′ ,
∑
j′∈c−b
xj′ .
To identify the extent of across-market demand heterogeneity, σ, we employ the
micro-moments proposed in Section 1.3.1. Define P0`j(σ) to be the probability that a
shoe j has zero sales given the N` consumers observed to purchase a shoe in location `.
We then define,
P0j(σ) =
1
L
L∑
`=1
P0`j(σ)
to be the fraction of markets that the model predicts will have zero sales for shoe j.
The empirical analogue is
Pˆ0j =
1
L
L∑
`=1
1{s`j = 0},
where s`j is the observed location level market shares for shoe j. Our micro moment
then identifies σ by matching the model’s prediction to the empirical analogue, i.e.
m(σ) =
J∑
j=1
(
P0j(σ)− Pˆ0j
)2
.
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To ease the estimation, we parameterize σ in the following way
σj = h(categoryj) = γc,
where σj depends on shoe j’s category. All demand parameters are estimated jointly
using GMM. A further description of the estimation procedure and identification argu-
ments are found in Sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4, respectively.
2.5 Results
In this section, we discuss our estimates and the fit of the model. We will define
our geographic locations to be composed of 165 Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs)
and our time horizons to be at the monthly level. We will begin by discussing the
demand parameters that are constant across locations. This will allow us to more easily
compare estimation results across methodologies and specifications. We then present
our heterogeneity results. We find that accounting for across-market heterogeneity is
particularly important for explaining the observed distribution of sales at the local level.
In the next section, we will conduct our counterfactual exercises.
2.5.1 Demand Parameters Constant Across Markets
A summary of our demand estimates is presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 for men’s and
women’s shoes, respectively. Each specification includes fixed effects for brand, color,
and time. We present six sets of estimates: (1) the simple logit demand model estimated
at the CSA level, which we will call “local simple logit,” (2) the simple logit demand
model estimated at the national level, which we will call “national simple logit,” and (3)
our estimation procedure, which we will call “QW simple logit.” Specifications (4), (5),
and (6) are the equivalent for the nested logit setup. We also account for any remaining
zeros using the correction proposed by Gandhi, Lu, and Shi (2014). A discussion of the
correction procedure can be found in Appendix B.2.
Specifications (1) and (4), the simple and nested logit demand models estimated
at the local level, illustrate the selection bias generated by the severity of the zeros
problem. When estimating the models at the CSA level, each observation is a product-
location specific share. Thus, the number of observations in the local simple and nested
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Table 2.5: Demand Estimates - Men’s
Simple Logit Nested Logit
Local National QW Local National QW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price -0.011 -0.019 -0.034 -0.029 -0.019 -0.024
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Comfort 0.030 0.102 0.085 0.004 -0.018 -0.012
(0.004) (0.017) (0.027) (0.005) (0.011) (0.015)
Look -0.112 -0.171 -0.175 -0.136 -0.062 -0.080
(0.004) (0.017) (0.031) (0.005) (0.012) (0.018)
Overall 0.214 0.436 0.530 0.209 0.249 0.312
(0.004) (0.018) (0.055) (0.006) (0.012) (0.031)
No Reviews 0.289 0.769 1.485 0.356 0.713 0.936
(0.013) (0.067) (0.160) (0.018) (0.044) (0.091)
Constant -13.472 -16.745 -17.406 -10.924 -10.091 -11.419
(0.030) (0.119) (0.519) (0.081) (0.142) (0.299)
λ — — — 0.129 0.602 0.512
(0.004) (0.011) (0.006)
σ — — ∗ — — ∗
Fixed Effects
Brand X X X X X X
Color X X X X X X
Month X X X X X X
N 28,916,910 175,254 175,254 28,916,910 175,254 175,254
Zeroes 27,597,784 30,282 30,282 27,597,784 30,282 30,282
(95.4%) (17.3%) (17.3%) (95.4%) (17.3%) (17.3%)
Price Elast.
Mean -1.035 -2.206 -3.828 -3.054 -5.501 -4.833
Std. Dev. (0.591) (1.637) (2.841) (1.745) (4.082) (4.033)
Notes: Estimated at the monthly level. “Local Simple Logit” (1) and “Local Nested Logit”
(4) estimate the simple and nested logit models at the CSA local market level, hence the
ξ’s are market level fixed effects. “National Simple Logit” (2) and “National Nested Logit”
(5) estimate the simple and nested logit models at the national level. Finally, “QW Simple
Logit” (3) and “QW Nested Logit” (6) estimate the simple and nested logit models using our
estimation technique to allow for across-market heterogeneity.
Standard errors in parentheses. All reported coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
∗ estimates for across-market heterogeneity in specifications (3) and (6) will be discussed in
the following subsection.
39
Table 2.6: Demand Estimates - Women’s
Simple Logit Nested Logit
Local National QW Local National QW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price 0.001 -0.008 -0.011 0.001 -0.003 -0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Comfort 0.105 0.053 0.084 0.108 -0.021 0.008
(0.002) (0.011) (0.025) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001)
Look -0.052 -0.096 -0.309 -0.054 -0.014 -0.044
(0.003) (0.011) (0.025) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013)
Overall 0.087 0.368 0.430 0.094 0.025 0.073
(0.003) (0.013) (0.028) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
No Reviews 0.136 0.426 0.323 0.147 0.035 0.076
(0.008) (0.039) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.001)
Constant -14.450 -17.938 -19.994 -14.629 -17.938 -11.614
(0.011) (0.052) (0.213) (0.014) (0.052) (0.097)
λ — — — -0.026 0.863 0.648
(0.001) (0.008) (0.024)
σ — — ∗ — — ∗
Fixed Effects
Brand X X X X X X
Color X X X X X X
Month X X X X X X
N 57,682,020 349,588 349,588 57,682,020 349,588 349,588
Zeroes 55,141,243 66,827 66,827 55,141,243 66,827 66,827
(95.6%) (19.1%) (19.1%) (95.6%) (19.1%) (19.1%)
Price Elast.
Mean 0.118 -0.949 -1.262 0.108 -2.866 -1.525
Std. Dev. (0.077) (0.813) (1.081) (0.071) (2.456) (1.339)
Notes: Estimated at the monthly level. “Local Simple Logit” (1) and “Local Nested Logit”
(4) estimate the simple and nested logit models at the CSA local market level, hence the
ξ’s are market level fixed effects. “National Simple Logit” (2) and “National Nested Logit”
(5) estimate the simple and nested logit models at the national level. Finally, “QW Simple
Logit” (3) and “QW Nested Logit” (6) estimate the simple and nested logit models using our
estimation technique to allow for across-market heterogeneity.
Standard errors in parentheses. All reported coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
∗ estimates for across-market heterogeneity in specifications (3) and (6) will be discussed in
the following subsection.
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logit models is 165 times greater (number of products times 165 CSAs) than the other
specifications. Unfortunately, at this level of disaggregation about 95% of the observa-
tions have zero sales resulting in coefficients that are severely biased toward zero. Of
particular concern for us are the price coefficients, which are positive for women, and
the nesting parameters in the nested logit models, which are severely attenuated for
men and negative for women. In the bottom panels of each table, we can see that the
local specifications imply price elasticities that are more inelastic than the other speci-
fications. With the result for women being nonsensically positive, implying an increase
in price would increase sales.
Specifications (2) and (3) directly compare the results estimated using the standard
approach on national level market shares and the results estimated using our procedure
for the simple logit model. Similarly, specifications (5) and (6) compare the estimates
for the nested logit model. Unsurprisingly, the results for these approaches are similar.
However, the advantage of our approach is that it retains information on the distribution
of heterogeneity across locations. The importance of this distinction will be highlighted
in the following section when we perform counterfactual analyses at the local level.
In the simple logit model estimated using our estimation technique (QW), the price
coefficients have the expected signs, -0.034 and -0.011 for men’s and women’s shoes,
respectively. These results suggest that men are far more price sensitive than women
when it comes to their footwear purchases with mean product level price elasticities of
-3.828 versus -1.262. While price coefficients in the nested logit specification are smaller
in magnitude when compared to the simple logit price coefficients, -0.024 and -0.005 for
men’s and women’s shoes, respectively, the additional flexibility of the nested logit model
has the expected effect on consumer substitution patterns. By allowing consumer level
taste shocks within categories of shoes to be correlated, the nested logit model reduces
the dependence on the idiosyncratic logit error. The result is price elasticities that are
larger in magnitude, -4.833 and -1.525 for men’s and women’s shoes, respectively.
Turning to the coefficients on our review variables, we can see that the overall rating
has the expected sign in all specifications, with higher ratings having positive effects
on demand. Look and comfort, however, appear to have a sign that is opposite from
the one expected in at least some specifications. It is possible that, after controlling
for the overall rating, the qualities that make a shoe more aesthetically pleasing or
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more comfortable reduces a shoe’s appeal through some other channel. Meanwhile,
our indicator for no reviews takes on positive signs for both men’s and women’s shoes.
This variable largely captures the demand for new products before there has been an
opportunity to review them. New products often benefit from additional promotion
and advertising and it is likely that the positive effect of having no review actually
reflects additional promotion, rather than a desire to purchase shoes that have not been
reviewed.
2.5.2 Across-Market Heterogeneity
Our results in the previous subsection depend on our estimates of σj = h(·). We identify
the distribution of across-market heterogeneity
σj = h(categoryj) = γc,
by matching the predicted (by the model) percentage of locations in which a product has
zero sales with the observed percentage of locations that have zero sales. Our estimates
for the across-market demand heterogeneity are presented in Table 2.7. For comparison,
the interquartile range and the standard deviation of mean utilities, δ, are also reported.
In general, women’s shoes tend to exhibit greater across-market demand hetero-
geneity than men’s shoes. This is due, in part, to the greater number of women’s shoe
varieties. Additionally, the the estimated across-market demand heterogeneity tends to
be smaller for the nested logit model. This is because the σ in the nested logit setup
is conditional on the differences in demand for categories across locations, whereas in
the simple logit setup differences in category demand across locations get soaked up
by σ. For example, suppose boat shoes had a 90% market share in location 1 and a
10% market share in location 2. The simple logit setup would require a large σ to
rationalize these differences. However, conditional on the overall demand for boat shoes
being smaller in location 2, the differences in demand for individual products, within
that category, across these location may be small.
Under the simple logit model, the men’s categories with the largest σ’s are slippers
(2.371) and sneakers (1.944), while the women’s categories with the largest σ’s are
boat (5.017), slippers (3.376), and sneakers (4.065). In the nested logit model, the
categories with the largest across-market heterogeneity, conditional on category choice,
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Table 2.7: Results: Across-Market Heterogeneity: σj = h(·)
Simple Logit Nested Logit
Men Women Men Women
Boat 1.311 5.017 0.652 0.879
Boots 0.505 1.777 0.248 0.798
Clogs 0.007 1.524 0.246 0.829
Flats — 0.536 — 0.582
Heels — 0.644 — 0.670
Oxfords 0.501 1.798 0.822 0.262
Sandals 0.348 0.305 0.568 0.190
Slippers 2.371 3.376 0.952 1.285
Sneakers 1.944 4.065 0.815 0.213
δ
IQR 2.988 4.835 1.720 2.320
St. Dev. 3.050 4.089 1.628 1.901
Distribution of across-market heterogeneity. The bottom
panel presents summary information on δ for comparisons
of magnitudes.
are oxfords (0.822), slippers (0.952), and sneakers (0.815) for men and slippers (1.285) for
women. These appear to be quite large with across-market variation in some categories
approaching the magnitude of the variation in the aggregate mean utilities of the simple
logit model and approaching about half the magnitude of the nested logit model.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the fit of our estimation technique and gives us further insight
into our heterogeneity results. It plots the percentage of location level zero market
shares by product. The left panels are plots for men’s shoes and the right panels are for
women’s shoes. The top panels are for simple logit and the bottom panels are for nested
logit. For comparison, we include simulation results for the case of homogeneous demand
across markets, i.e. when σj = 0 for all shoes j. At the head of the distribution there
are fewer location level zero market shares, but, because mean utilities are relatively
high, variation is required to produce these zeros. Moving toward the middle of the
distribution, this variation is able to account for the increasing percentage of zero market
shares. If demand were homogeneous across markets, we would expect to see far fewer
zeros among popular and mid-ranked products.
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Figure 2.3: Goodness of Fit: Percentage of Location Level Zeros
Notes: (top) Simple Logit (bottom) Nested Logit (left) Men’s (right) Women’s. For each product,
percentage of locations with zero sales in the data (solid), in our estimation with across-market hetero-
geneity (vertical-dash), and with homogeneous demand across markets (dash).
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2.6 Analysis of the Estimated Model
In this section, we use the estimated model to perform counterfactual analysis under a
series of restricted choice sets. We will begin by presenting our primary results, allowing
for tastes to differ across markets and for local brick-and-mortar retailers to customize
their assortments to local demand (Section 2.6.1). We will then present results shutting
down local assortment customization and show how these results overestimate the gains
to online variety (Section 2.6.2). Finally, we revisit the phenomenon of the long tail and
show that aggregation of sales over markets with different tastes is a key driver of the
long tail of online retail (Section 2.6.3).
Since local brick-and-mortar product assortments are often not directly observed by
researchers, they must be inferred from the estimated demand system. Consistent with
the literature, we assume local brick-and-mortar retailers stock the top K` most popular
products. The ordering of products is determined by the estimated local mean utilities
from the demand system. The literature often establishes the same threshold for all
markets, but we have more information we can bring to bear. While we cannot directly
match our online sales data and our brick-and-mortar assortment data, we can use the
counts as a guide to our selection of local level assortment sizes. We also examine the
robustness of our results for a range of thresholds in the next section.
Mechanically, to compute our counterfactuals, we draw a set of η`j ’s for each location.
Products are then ranked in each location by their location specific mean utilities and the
top products are included in the counterfactual choice set. For each counterfactual choice
set, location level choice probabilities are then calculated according to Equation 2.1.
Using these probabilities, we simulate location level purchases, which then allow us to
compute counterfactual consumer welfare and retail revenue.
2.6.1 Counterfactuals with Across-Market Heterogeniety
We begin our analysis by performing the counterfactuals for our primary result. In each
counterfactual, we restrict the size of the choice set in each market, but each market
is allowed to carry the top products specific to that location. Consumer purchasing
decisions are then simulated under the restricted choice sets. For each counterfactual
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scenario and specification, we calculate location level consumer welfare
CS` =

Mω`
α log
(
1 +
∑J
j=1 exp{δj + η`j}
)
(Simple)
Mω`
α log
(
1 +
∑
c∈C
(∑
j∈c exp{δj + η`j}
)1−λ)
(Nested)
,
and retail revenue,
r`j = pjMω`pi`j ,
where M is the size of the national population. For each of our specifications, Table 2.8
presents the increase in consumer welfare from online variety and Table 2.9 presents
the consumer welfare and retail revenue under the restricted choice set relative to the
unconstrained online choice set.
Examining the results of our estimation technique, we find that when consumers are
able to move from a world where they only have access to the goods available at their
local stores to a world where they have access to the whole online choice set, consumer
welfare increases by 10.4% or $57.69 million under the simple logit model and by 6.8%
or $57.20 million under the nested logit model.
Table 2.8: Local Choice Set: Consumer Welfare Increase
Simple Logit Nested Logit
Local QW Local QW
Increase
- Absolute ($ Millions) 0.02 57.69 0.72 57.20
- Percent ∼ 0% 10.4% ∼ 0% 6.8%
The deficiencies of using the standard approach with location level market shares
is also highlighted by Table 2.8. Consistent with Ellison and Glaeser (1997), ignoring
the local level small samples problem and employing a local level simple or nested logit
estimation exaggerates the extent of heterogeneity across markets. By assuming prod-
ucts without an observed sale are completely unwanted at that particular location, it is
“easier” for our hypothetical brick-and-mortar retailers to customize their assortments
to local demand. This leads us to understate the gains to consumer welfare. In our
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application, using the standard approach with location level market shares implies that
the consumer welfare gains from online variety are almost nonexistent. This is because,
in our data, relatively few shoe varieties make up the observed sales in individual local
markets. Thus relatively few shoe varieties are required to completely satisfy local de-
mand when ignoring the small samples problem. Note that we omit the national level
specifications. While these specifications may be consistent with across-market demand
heterogeneity, there is no way to determine the underlying geographic distribution of
heterogeneity.
Table 2.9: Local Choice Set: Share of Unconstrained
Simple Logit Nested Logit
Local QW Local QW
Consumer Welfare ∼ 100% 90.6% ∼ 100% 93.6%
Revenue ∼ 100% 89.8% ∼ 100% 92.2%
Table 2.9 suggests that consumer welfare derived from access to online variety may
be surprisingly small. Using our preferred specifications, QW simple and nested logit,
if local stores stock products that target local demand, consumers would capture 90.6%
to 93.6% of the unconstrained consumer welfare - the total consumer welfare that would
be obtained with access to all of the products. Conversely, having access to the entire
online choice set only accounts for 6.4% to 9.4% of the total unconstrained consumer
welfare. Similar conclusions can be drawn for retailer revenue. A national brick-and-
mortar chain can generate 89.8% to 92.2% of the total revenue it would generate by
stocking the universe of products, by stocking a only small number of well selected
products. Also, Table 2.9 again highlights the effects of ignoring the small samples
problem. Similar to the result for consumers, estimates ignoring the small samples
problem imply almost zero benefits to firms of stocking the entire universe of varieties.
2.6.2 Counterfactuals with Nationally Standardized Choice Sets
In this subsection, we perform counterfactual analyses similar to the ones above. How-
ever, we impose the additional constraint that each market will be restricted to the top
47
products determined by ranking products according to their national mean utilities, δj .
Using our preferred estimates, Table 2.10 presents the increase in consumer welfare from
online variety and Table 2.11 presents the consumer welfare and retail revenue under
the restricted choice set relative to the unconstrained online choice set.
Table 2.10: National Choice Set: Consumer Welfare Increase (QW Estimates)
Local Choice Set National Choice Set
Simple Nested Simple Nested
Increase
- Absolute ($ Millions) 57.69 57.20 194.68 146.63
- Percent 10.4% 6.8% 45.5% 19.5%
Table 2.10 shows that failing to account for customization in local assortments will
overstate the gains to consumer welfare. Under a standardized national assortment,
access to online variety increases consumer welfare by 45.5% or $194.68 million in the
simple logit model and by 19.5% or $146.63 million in the nested logit model. This
suggests failing to account for heterogeneity across markets will overstate consumer
welfare due to online variety by 338% in percentage terms and 237% in absolute terms
under the simple logit model and by 187% in percentage terms and 156% in absolute
terms under the nested logit model. The overstatement occurs because the initial welfare
(pre-internet) of consumers is lower when choice sets are nationally standardized than
when they are locally targeted, which can be seen in Table 2.11. That is, failing to allow
for local customization in assortments will overstate how bad the world was before the
internet.
Note that our counterfactual results are nearly identical, whether the model is esti-
mated using standard approaches with aggregate (national) level market shares or our
estimation method with nationally standardized assortments, so we omit them here.
This is unsurprising given our demand results and because, under both specifications,
consumers from different locations are pooled into a single population at the national
level. The drawback of using national level market shares, however, as previously men-
tioned, is that there is no way to determine the underlying geographic distribution of
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heterogeneity preventing local level analysis.
Table 2.11: National Choice Set: Share of Unconstrained (QW Estimates)
Local Choice Set National Choice Set
Simple Nested Simple Nested
Consumer Welfare 90.6% 93.6% 68.3% 83.7%
Revenue 89.8% 92.2% 69.7% 80.5%
Turning to retailer revenue we see that a researcher assuming nationally standard-
ized assortments will severely underestimate counterfactual brick-and-mortar revenue.
Under the simple logit specification, a national brick-and-mortar chain would generate
just 69.7% of total unconstrained revenues with a nationally standardized assortment
compared to 89.8% of total unconstrained revenues with locally customized assortments.
For nested logit, these numbers are 80.5% and 92.2%, respectively. This suggests that
there is a significant incentive for local stores to cater to local demand. By doing so
they would obtain 14.5% to 28.8% greater revenue than under a nationally standardized
assortment.
2.6.3 Long Tail Analysis
Our counterfactual results in the previous two subsections suggest that “shorter” tails
at the local level underly the long tail at the national level. Using the raw sales data,
Figure 2.4 illustrates how local level “short” tails can aggregate to a national level long
tail. It plots the cumulative share of revenue going to the top K products for the
median CSA (by number of monthly sales), middle 20%, middle 40%, and national level
markets. For a single local market, we can see that there is an extremely short tail with
fewer than 3,000 products making up all the of sales in that CSA. Since the popularity
of products varies wildly across geographic markets, aggregating over markets increases
the number of different varieties sold and decreases the density of sales among the top
ranked products. Sales becoming less concentrated among the top products produces a
lengthening effect on the tail of the sales distribution.
However, the small samples problem in the raw data presents us with a skewed
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Figure 2.4: Aggregating to the Long Tail
perspective in that it suggests a ridiculously short tail at the local level. Using our
estimated model, we can correct for the small samples problem in our long tail analysis
by simulating a large number of sales in these markets. Figure 2.5 plots the cumulative
share of revenue going to the top K products for the median CSA correcting for the
small samples problem. As expected, we find that the local tail is actually quite a bit
longer than suggested by the raw data.
Table 2.12 further illustrates the effect of small samples on the local tail. It presents
the average share of revenue accruing to products outside of the top 3,000 products. At
the national level, more than 50% of revenue comes from products ranked outside the
top 3,000. At the local level, if we were to rely on the raw data, we would find that
only 3.4% of revenue comes from products ranked outside the top 3,000 products. In
other words, 96.6% of demand could be satisfied with just 3,000 well targeted products
in each market. This may lead us to erroneously conclude that there is no long tail as
described in the existing literature. Simulating our model with the same small number
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Figure 2.5: Local Tail: Correcting for Small Samples
of sales in each local market yields very similar results.10 However, by simulating
a large number of sales in each local market, we find that there is, in fact, significant
demand for niche products at the local level with 23.6% to 31.6% of sales coming from
products outside the top 3,000 products.
Table 2.12: Average Revenue Share of Products Outside of the Top 3,000
Small Sample Large Sample
Data Model (Logit) Logit Nested
National 50.6% 49.4% 50.6% 50.6%
Local 3.4% 2.6% 31.6 23.6%
10 Given the small number of sales at the local level, this result is unsurprising. For example, suppose
fewer than 3,000 sales are observed in a local market. Then, of course, the share of revenue going to
products outside the top 3,000 is zero.
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2.7 Robustness
In this section, we examine the robustness of our findings to the size of the counterfactual
choice set. While we find that size of the overstatement is sensitive to the size of the
counterfactual assortment size, our findings from the previous section are on the lower
end, suggesting that our conclusions are on the conservative side. Tables 2.13 and
2.14 present the change in consumer welfare and the size of the overstatement resulting
from various thresholds of the counterfactual choice set for the simple and nested logit
specifications, respectively. For comparison, we also include our baseline results from
the previous section.
Table 2.13: Robustness: Overstatement of Consumer Welfare Increase (Simple Logit)
Percent Increase Absolute ($ Millions)
Assortment Size Loc. Nat. %∆ Loc. Nat. ∆ %∆
Baseline 10.4 45.5 337.5 57.69 194.68 136.99 237.46
Threshold
3,000 42.2 169.9 302.6 182.01 386.37 204.36 112.28
6,000 24.5 98.4 301.6 108.42 304.41 195.99 180.77
12,000 6.1 45.3 642.6 35.28 191.45 156.17 442.66
24,000 0.5 14.6 2920 3.39 78.28 74.89 2209.14
Unsurprisingly, as the size of the counterfactual choice set increases the gain to con-
sumers from access to the remaining products decreases. This decrease occurs substan-
tially faster under locally customized assortments than under nationally standardized
assortments. As a result, the percentage overstatement is increasing in the assortment
size, despite the absolute size of the overstatement decreasing. This pattern is illustrated
in Figure 2.7. Figure 2.7 can be read as the estimated consumer welfare overstatement
when assuming no local assortment customization, measured in millions of dollars (solid)
and as a percentage (dash). In the simple logit setup, the absolute consumer welfare
overstatement peaks at $204.5 with about about 6% of products (or 3,000 shoe varieties)
and in the nested logit setup, the absolute overstatement peaks at $207.9 million with
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Table 2.14: Robustness: Overstatement of Consumer Welfare Increase (Nested Logit)
Percent Increase Absolute ($ Millions)
Assortment Size Loc. Nat. %∆ Loc. Nat. ∆ %∆
Baseline 6.8 19.5 186.8 57.20 146.63 89.43 156.35
Threshold
3,000 24.6 71.1 189.0 354.19 372.74 18.55 5.24
6,000 13.7 45.6 232.8 216.61 281.11 64.50 29.78
12,000 4.7 19.8 321.3 81.00 148.13 67.13 82.88
24,000 0.8 5.6 600.0 15.01 47.90 32.89 219.12
about about 2% of products (or 1,000 shoe varieties). For both setups, the percentage
overstatement approaches infinity as the fraction of available products approaches one.
Tables 2.15 and 2.16 present the retail revenue at various thresholds of the coun-
terfactual choice set for simple and nested logit, respectively. With retail revenue, we
find that as assortment size increases, the gain from customizing assortments to local
demand is decreasing. However, a typical large brick-and-mortar shoe retailer stocks, at
most, a few thousand varieties. This puts them at the small end of our robustness anal-
ysis, suggesting there may be significant incentives for large national brick-and-mortar
shoe retailers to customize their assortments to local demand.
Figure 2.7 graphs the increase in retail revenue due to local customization of as-
sortments, measured in millions of dollars (solid) and as a percentage (dash). In the
simple logit setup, the absolute gain in revenue from localization peaks at $273.4 mil-
lion at about 5% of products (or 2,500 shoe varieties), while in the nested logit setup,
the absolute gain in revenue from localization peaks at $165.9 million at about 3% of
products (or 1,500 shoe varieties). The percentage gain is monotonically decreasing
with assortment size. The graph shows that when assortment sizes are extremely lim-
ited, brick-and-mortar retailers can significantly boost revenue by maintaining locally
customized product assortments.
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Figure 2.6: Overestimation of Consumer Welfare
(a) Simple Logit
(b) Nested Logit
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Table 2.15: Robustness: Retail Revenue (Simple Logit)
Absolute ($ Millions)
Assortment Size Loc. Nat. ∆ %∆
Baseline 742.50 576.53 165.97 28.79
Threshold
3,000 565.36 292.97 272.39 92.98
6,000 665.44 411.52 253.92 61.70
12,000 771.07 586.03 185.04 31.58
24,000 820.78 742.45 78.33 10.55
Table 2.16: Robustness: Retail Revenue (Nested Logit)
Absolute ($ Millions)
Assortment Size Loc. Nat. ∆ %∆
Baseline 610.68 533.57 77.11 14.45
Threshold
3,000 506.34 344.55 161.79 46.96
6,000 559.42 408.78 150.64 36.85
12,000 620.94 523.99 96.95 18.50
24,000 655.43 622.20 33.23 5.34
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Figure 2.7: Increase in Retail Revenue from Local Assortments
(a) Simple Logit
(b) Nested Logit
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2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we quantified the effect of increased access to variety due to online retail
on consumer welfare and firm profitability. The value of online variety depends on the
set of products that would be available through traditional brick-and-mortar retailers
in the absence of the internet. Since traditional brick-and-mortar retailers tend to cater
their product assortments to local demand, we highlight the importance of accounting
for across-market differences in demand and assortments. We built a new micro-level
data set containing the sales of footwear by a large online retailer to estimate a rich
model of demand allowing for consumer demand heterogeneity across markets.
The detailed nature of our data allows us to perform analysis at narrow product
definitions and fine levels of geographic detail. However, it also presents us with an
empirical challenge because, at these fine levels of detail, we discover an issue with small
sample sizes. This is epitomized by the zeros problem, where products are observed to
have zero market share. The zeros problem becomes increasingly severe at increasing
levels of disaggregation, but aggregation obscures the across-market heterogeneity of
interest to us. These zeros are problematic for standard demand estimation and usual
remedies have been shown to generate biased estimates.
We use new methodology developed in Chapter 1 to confront our small samples
problem. Rather than use disaggregated local market shares directly, we use our infor-
mation on location-specific sales as a type of micro moment to augment our estimation
with aggregated sales data. Our estimation strategy exploits the structure of the model
to separate the problem into two parts. At the aggregate level our estimation mimics
the standard approach to pin down the demand parameters common across locations.
Separately, our micro moments are used to estimate the distribution of consumer het-
erogeneity across markets.
We find products face substantial heterogeneity in demand across markets, with
more niche products facing greater heterogeneity. We also show that accounting for this
heterogeneity is important for rationalizing the distribution of local sales. Using our
estimated model, we run a series of counterfactuals. In this analysis we find that ab-
stracting from across-market demand heterogeneity overestimates the consumer welfare
gain due to online markets by up to 338%. On the supply side, our estimates suggest
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that brick-and-mortar retail chains generate up to 28.8% additional revenue by local-
izing their assortments. Finally, we revisit the long tail phenomenon in online retail.
Our results suggest that inferring consumer welfare gains from the observed aggregate
long tail will tend to overstate actual welfare gains because the aggregation of sales over
markets with differing demand is a key driver of the long tail.
Our approach relies on the law of large numbers in the number of markets rather than
in the number of purchases. Thus, it can be useful when there are many markets and only
the distribution of heterogeneity is required. In addition to measuring across-market
heterogeneity, our approach is well tailored to examining the effects of discrimination by
firms with knowledge of the realizations of heterogeneity. This is the context in which
we apply our methodology in this paper; we could think of brick-and-mortar retailers
in our application as discriminating across locations though their assortment selection.
In future work, we plan to extend our methodology to include more flexible demand
systems, in particular, to the full random coefficients model. Additionally, we intend to
apply our methodology to examine the homogenization or fragmentation of consumer
tastes across regions over time.
Chapter 3
Bertrand Competition and
Non-Collusive Basing-Point
Pricing
3.1 Introduction
In an environment with spatial differentiation, basing-point pricing occurs when the
delivered prices faced by a consumer is determined by the consumer’s distance from a
common location, known as the basing point. That is, the price faced by a consumer
at any given location is equal to the price charged by firms at the basing point plus the
cost of transportation from the basing point to the consumer’s location regardless of
the actual location of the selling firm. The difference in transportation costs, pocketed
by the selling firm, is often referred to as phantom freight. Figure 3.1 illustrates this
phenomenon for a simple unit line location model.
Much of the early work on the topic, such as Stigler (1949) and McGee (1954), argued
that basing-point pricing was a mechanism for firms at different locations to collude. A
couple of the more noteworthy real world examples, “Pittsburgh Plus” and the “Eau
Claire Rule,” are commonly understood to be the result of collusion, the latter being
government imposed. In the early 1900’s, under the Pittsburgh Plus pricing system,
consumers of steel would be charged the price of steel at Pittsburgh plus the cost of
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Figure 3.1: Basing-Point Pricing Illustration
Consider an economy of unit length with consumers having inelastic demand uniformly distributed
over the line. Suppose production occurs in two locations, sites A = 0 and B ∈ (0, 1). For convenience,
assume firms at both sites face constant marginal costs equal to zero and transportation costs, τ , are a
linear function of distance. Further suppose that competition at site A results in the competitive mill
price equal to zero. Then the basing-point price is the transportation cost from site A to the consumers
location. The transportation costs of site B are represented by the dotted lines emanating in either
direction from the point B. If firms at site B charge consumers the basing-point price, they obtain
phantom freight equal to the difference between site A and site B transportation costs to deliver to that
consumer.
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transporting that steel from Pittsburgh to the consumer’s location regardless of the
actual seller’s location. The Eau Claire Rule was a federal pricing scheme established
in the 1930’s to support local dairy farmers. It set minimum prices processors must pay
to farmers for beverage-grade milk. The price floor for a given market was set based
upon the distance of that market from Eau Claire, Wisconsin (Killman 1997).
From a purely price standpoint, basing-point pricing makes the choice of producer
irrelevant to the consumer, resulting in abnormalities, such as freight absorption and
cross-hauling. Since transportation is costly, these abnormalities are commonly viewed
as inefficient consequences of collusion. Freight absorption occurs when producers in
relatively high price areas ship goods toward areas with relatively low prices. In order
to make this sale, the producer will absorb some of the transportation cost to make its
delivered price competitive with the low price goods. Cross-hauling occurs when goods
produced at location A cross goods produced at location B. An extreme example is when
producers at location A are shipping to consumers at location B, while simultaneously
producers at location B are shipping to consumers at location A.
On the opposing side of the argument, Haddock (1982) formalized a theory of basing-
point pricing that was not the result of collusion across production sites. In his model,
firms face constant marginal costs, but allows for potential scale economies in trans-
portation. There are multiple producers at the basing point, but he is agnostic about
the form of competition, while there is only one monopolistic non-basing point firm.
Facing inelastic demand from each location, the non-basing point firm matches the de-
livered price of the basing point in order to extract spatial rent. He further argued
that basing-point pricing is inconsistent with an effective cartel because there almost
always exists a more profitable alternative strategy. In particular, a cartel could increase
its profits by eliminating the inefficient anomalies discussed in the previous paragraph.
Additionally, he put forth several potential competitive motivations for cross-hauling.1
The results in Haddock (1982) were later refined by Gilligan (1993). Gilligan notes
that basing-point pricing is only consistent with marginal cost pricing at the base site.
Otherwise, the delivered price gradient would also reflect spatial price discrimination
rather than transportation costs alone. Additionally, he allows the non-basing point
1 These motivations include preventing supply interruption, information costs, and decreasing
marginal transportation cost as a function of distance.
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production site to contain more than a single monopoly firm and derives conditions
under which a basing-point pricing equilibrium exists. He concludes that if non-basing
point firms are von Stackleberg leaders with respect to basing-point firms, basing-point
pricing can arise without perfect collusion if demand in their markets are large relative
to unit transportation costs and the number of firms.
In this chapter, I extend the non-collusive theories of basing-point pricing to allow
for Bertrand competition among firms located outside of the basing point.2 When
non-basing point firms face increasing marginal costs that rise at a sufficiently high
rate, these firms stop competing amongst each other and instead compete against the
basing-point. Under Bertrand competition, non-basing point firms match the delivered
price of the basing point resulting in a basing-point pricing pattern.
This model has several attractive features. First, this model allows cross-hauling
to arise without imposing economies in long-haul transportation or product hetero-
geneity. Depending on the distances involved in a particular application, the imposi-
tion of long-haul scale economies may not be a plausible assumption. Additionally, in
many real world examples of basing-point pricing the products involved were highly, if
not perfectly, substitutable, potentially making the product heterogeneity explanation
unattractive. Second, the basing-point pricing result can easily be extended to account
for multiple non-basing points. In particular, adding a second non-basing point produc-
tion site would not necessarily cause the basing-point price result to breakdown in my
setup. Third, if production at a non-basing point site grows sufficiently large, that site
would itself become an additional basing point. Further, I extend the model from a unit
line to a circular setting with the basing point in the center. An interesting implication
of the additional directional dimension is that basing-point pricing may be observed in
some radial markets, while failing in others.
This chapter will proceed as follows. The next section presents the unit line model.
Section 3 derives the basing-point pricing result. A discussion of the implications of
the model and results can be found in section 4. Section 5 extends the model and the
basing-point pricing result to a circular environment and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Using his model with constant marginal costs of production, Gilligan (1993) notes that “Bertrand
behavior by non-base site firms is never consistent with basing-point pricing.”
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3.2 Model
Consider an economy of unit length with location indexed by r ∈ [0, 1]. The economy
is populated by identical consumers distributed uniformly over the line, each having
inelastic demand x. Production of an identical consumption good occurs at two sites,
A and B. Site A is situated at location 0, A=0, and site B is located at some point
between site A and the end of the line, B ∈ (0, 1). At site A, NA > 1 firms face equal
and constant marginal costs, while at site B, NB firms face increasing marginal costs.
Per unit transportation costs vary linearly with distance from the purchasing site,
τ(r, s) = τ |r − s|, ∀r ∈ [0, 1], s ∈ {A,B}.
Under Bertrand competition, profits for a firm at site A, a ∈ {1, ..., NA}, are
pia =
∫ 1
0
pa(r)qa(r)dr − CA(Qa),
where pa(r) is the mill price firm a charges to location r, qa(r) is the quantity firm
a sells to location r, and CA(·) is the cost of producing Qa =
∫ 1
0 qa(r)dr units of the
consumption good at site A. Similarly, profits for a firm at site B, b ∈ {1, ..., NB}, are
pib =
∫ 1
0
pb(r)qb(r)dr − CB(Qb).
Define the delivered price offered to location r to be the sum of the mill price charged
to location r and the cost of transportation to location r,
pˆa(r) = pa(r) + τr
pˆb(r) = pb(r) + τ |r −B|,
then the quantity demanded at location r from a site A firm is
qa(r) =

0 if ∃a′ s.t pˆa(r) > pˆa′(r) or ∃b s.t pˆa(r) > pˆb(r)
x
NA
if pˆa(r) = pˆa′(r), ∀a′ and pˆa(r) < pˆb(r), ∀b
x if pˆa(r) < pˆa′(r),∀a′ and pˆa(r) < pˆb(r), ∀b.
and from a site B firm
qb(r) =

0 if ∃b′ s.t pˆb(r) > pˆb′(r) or ∃a s.t pˆb(r) > pˆa(r)
x
NB
if pˆb(r) = pˆb′(r),∀b′ and pˆb(r) ≤ pˆa(r), ∀a
x if pˆb(r) < pˆb′(r),∀b′ and pˆb(r) ≤ pˆa(r), ∀a.
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Definition. An equilibrium is a set of delivered prices {pˆ∗a, pˆ∗b} = {pˆ∗a(r), pˆ∗b(r)}r∈[0,1]
and quantities {q∗a, q∗b} = {q∗a(r), q∗b (r)}r∈[0,1], a ∈ {1, ..., NA}, b ∈ {1, ..., NB}, s.t.
1. A firm, s ∈ {1, ..., NS}, at site S ∈ {A,B}, chooses prices, pˆs, to maximize profits,
given prices of other firms, pˆ∗−s, i.e.
pis(pˆ∗s; pˆ
∗
−s) ≥ pis(pˆs; pˆ∗−s)
2. No arbitrage: The prices of a firm, s ∈ {1, ..., NS}, at site S ∈ {A,B} satisfy
pˆ∗s(r) ≤ pˆ∗s(r′) + τ |r − r′|, ∀r, r′ ∈ [0, 1].
3. Markets clear:
NA∑
a
q∗a(r) +
NB∑
b
q∗b (r) = x, ∀r ∈ [0, 1].
3.3 Basing-Point Pricing
Under Bertrand competition, competition at site A results in a mill price equal to
marginal cost, pa(r) = pA(r) = C ′A, ∀a, and, for convenience, assume the that C ′A = 0.
A consumer at location r ∈ [0, 1] can then purchase the consumption good from any
site A firm, a ∈ {1, ..., NA} at the price
pˆA(r) = τr.
The following lemma shows that under basing-point pricing firms at site B will
satisfy all demand to the right of site B before selling to the left, toward site A.
Lemma 1. Under basing-point pricing, firms at site B strictly prefer to sell to any
point to their right, [B, 1], over selling to any point to their left, [0, B).
Proof. The difference in transportation costs between site A and site B of delivering to
location r is
τ(r,A)− τ(r,B) =
τr − τ(B − r) = 2τr − τB if r < Bτr − τ(r −B) = τB if r ≥ B.
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For any r < B, 2r − B < B, that is, the difference in transportation costs between
site A and site B of delivering to location r is greater to the right of site B. Therefore,
under basing-point pricing, the marginal revenue of selling to locations to the right of
B is greater than marginal revenue of selling to the left of B. 
Define qB(r) =
∑NB
b=1 qb(r). The following proposition establishes conditions for the
basing-point pricing property under Bertrand competition. The key to the result is that
marginal costs for site B firms rise sufficiently quickly so that it is unprofitable to sell
to any consumers to the left of site B. In this situation, firms at site B are able to sell
as much of the good as they please at the site A basing-point price and, as a result, do
not compete against other site B firms.
Proposition 1. Suppose CB(·) is a continuous function s.t. CB(0) = 0, C ′B(·) ≥ 0, and
C ′′B(·) > 0. If
C ′B
(∫ 1
B
qB(r)dr
)
≥ pˆ∗A(1)− τ(1−B) = τB
then dpˆ∗A(r) = dpˆ
∗
B(r) = τ , ∀r.
Proof. Due to symmetry, all site B firms behave alike, so pˆ∗b = pˆ
∗
B, ∀b. Since competition
at site A results in
pˆ∗A(r) = τr, ∀r ∈ [0, 1]
and
dpˆ∗A(r)
dr
= τ,
it suffices to show that pˆ∗B(r) = pˆ
∗
A(r) for any r ∈ [0, 1] s.t. qb(r) > 0.
By Lemma 1, we know that firms at site B will first satisfy demand to their right,
[B, 1]. The conditions on site B’s cost function suggest that site B firms will fall short
of satisfying or just satisfy demand in [B, 1]. Thus there will be no site B sales to the
left of site B, [0, B). With this knowledge, I begin by finding the site B’s optimal level
of production at the basing-point price, then show that no site B firms want to deviate
from basing-point pricing.
Note that if C ′B(0) > pˆ
∗
A(B), the result is trivial because site B firms will make
no sales. Thus, suppose C ′B(0) ≤ pˆ∗A(B). Then by the intermediate value theorem
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∃B¯ ∈ [B, 1] be s.t.
C ′B
(∫ B¯
B
qB(r)dr
)
= pˆ∗A(B¯)− τ(B¯ −B) = τB
I show that it is unprofitable for a site B firm, b ∈ {1, ..., NB}, to deviate from pˆb =
pˆ∗B = pˆ
∗
A and
q∗b (r) = q
∗
B(r) =

x
NB
if r ∈ [B, B¯]
0 else
.
The profit of firm b at the basing-point price is
pib(pˆ∗A) =
1
NB
∫ B¯
B
[pˆ∗A(r)x− τ(r −B)x]dr − CB
(
1
NB
∫ B¯
B
xdr
)
=
1
NB
∫ B¯
B
τBxdr − CB
(
1
NB
∫ B¯
B
xdr
)
=
τBx(B¯ −B)
NB
− CB
(
x(B¯ −B)
NB
)
= τBQb(pˆ∗A)− CB(Qb(pˆ∗A)).
At the basing-point price the marginal profit of a change in price at some location
r ∈ [0, 1] is equal to
∂pib(pˆb)
∂pˆb(r)
∣∣∣∣
pˆb=pˆ
∗
A
=

[
τB − C ′B(Qb(pˆb))
]∂Qb(pˆb)
∂pˆb(r)
∣∣∣
pˆb=pˆ
∗
A
if r ∈ [B, 1][
2τr − τB − C ′B(Qb(pˆb))
]∂Qb(pˆb)
∂pˆb(r)
∣∣∣
pˆb=pˆ
∗
A
if r ∈ [0, B)
Note that
∂Qb(pˆb)
∂pˆb(r)
∣∣∣
pˆb=pˆ
∗
A
> 0 if ∂pb(r) < 0
∂Qb(pˆb)
∂pˆb(r)
∣∣∣
pˆb=pˆ
∗
A
< 0 if ∂pb(r) > 0 and r ∈ [B, B¯]
∂Qb(pˆb)
∂pˆb(r)
∣∣∣
pˆb=pˆ
∗
A
= 0 if ∂pb(r) > 0 and r ∈ [0, B) ∪ (B¯, 1]
Additionally, since C ′B(Qb(pˆ
∗
A)) = τB and C
′′(·) > 0,
C ′B(Qb(pˆb)) ≥ τB if ∂pb(r) < 0
C ′B(Qb(pˆb)) ≤ τB if ∂pb(r) > 0.
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Therefore,
∂pib(pˆb)
∂pˆb(r)
∣∣∣∣
pˆb=pˆ
∗
A
≤ 0,
i.e.
pi∗b (pˆ
∗
A) ≥ pi∗b (pˆb),
for any alternative vector of delivered prices pˆb. 
Figure 3.2(a) illustrates this result. This figure plots the supply and demand curves
faced by site B as a function marginal revenue, which is equal to the delivered price net
of transaction costs. The demand curve faced by site B begins flat because the difference
in transportation costs between sites A and B is constant at all points to the right of
site B. Net of transportation costs, consumers to the right of site B are willing to pay
up to p∗B(r) = τB. With (1−B) consumers, each having inelastic demand of x, to the
right of site B, site B firms can sell up to QB = x(1−B) units of the consumption good
at this price. In order to increase above QB = x(1−B), site B firms would have to turn
to consumers to the left of site B, toward site A. In this direction, transportation costs
from site A are decreasing, while transportation costs from site B are increasing. As
a result, site B firms will have to charge lower prices to sell to these consumers. After
QB = x(1−B/2), the midpoint between A and B, transportation costs from site B are
greater than the delivered price of site A. Thus, selling to consumers beyond this point
would be unprofitable.
If site B’s aggregate marginal cost (supply) curve crosses the demand curve before
QB = x(1−B), the competitive Bertrand equilibrium outcome is for all site B firms to
charge a delivered price equal to the basing-point price, pˆ∗B(r) = pˆ
∗
A(r) = τr, or a price
net of transaction costs equal to p∗B(r) = τB. As a result, site B firms do not compete
against each other, but only against site A. Intuitively, this is because site B firms are
not concerned about being undercut by other site B firms. (1) If a site B firm were to be
undercut it knows that it could find another consumer willing to pay the basing-point
price. (2) Every site B firm is able to sell as much as it pleases at the basing-point price,
attempting to increase its market share by undercutting another site B firm would only
serve to increase its marginal costs. On the other hand, Figure 3.2(b) illustrates an
equilibrium in which site B’s aggregate marginal cost curve intersects the demand curve
after QB = x(1−B). In this case, site B firms will compete against each other and the
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(a) Basing-Point Pricing Equilibrium
(b) Non-Basing-Point Pricing Equilibrium
Figure 3.2: Site B - Supply and Demand
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market price charged by site B firms will be below the basing-point price. This result
is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose CB(0) = 0, C ′B(·) ≥ 0, and C ′′B(·) > 0. If
C ′B
(∫ 1
B
qB(r)dr
)
< τB
then dpˆ∗B(r) 6= τ , ∀r.
Proof. By the intermediate value theorem ∃B ∈ [B2 , B] s.t.
C ′B
(∫ 1
B
qB(r)dr
)
= pˆ∗A(B)− τ(B −B) = τ(2B −B).
It is straightforward to show that in equilibrium, site B firms charge a mill price equal
to
p∗(r) = τ(2B −B).
As a result,
dpˆ∗B(r) =
−τ if r ∈ [0, B)τ if r ∈ [B, 1] ,
that is basing-point pricing does not occur in equilibrium. 
3.4 Implications
The results present a clear and testable implication of my theory for competitive basing-
point pricing stemming from Lemma 1. It implies that non-basing point firms only sell
to the right, away from the basing point. Additionally, the model has several attractive
features. First, notice that the condition for basing-point pricing is that non-basing
point firms are unable to fully satisfy demand to their right. As a consequence, sales
from site A are required to satisfy the residual demand. It follows that, in this model,
cross-hauling occurs without needing to impose economies of long-haul transportation
or product heterogeneity.
Second, a common criticism of current non-collusive theories of basing-point pricing
is that the result breaks down with the addition of another, well placed, non-basing
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point.3 Suppose a second non-basing point site, site C, is added to the model above,
between site B and the end of the line. Under the current theories of non-collusive
basing-point pricing, firms at sites B and C will directly compete with each other. Thus,
if site B attempted to charge the basing-point price, site C would profit by undercutting
site B and vice versa. As a result, basing-point pricing fails and the pricing pattern
for sites B and C is reminiscent of a standard Hotelling model with locational price
discrimination. This example is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Multiple Non-Basing Points
On the other hand, it is straightforward to extend the basing-point pricing result
with an additional non-basing point in my model. First, one would show that proposition
1 holds for site C, then show that it holds for site B with the residual demand left over
by site C. In this way, the basing-point pricing result can be further generalized to an
arbitrary number of non-basing-point sites.
Third, it has been observed that industries that develop a basing-point pricing sys-
tem often begin with a large production center, typically of historic importance, as the
basing point. However, when production at a non-basing point location grows to a sig-
nificant level, that location itself will become an additonal basing point, transforming
3 See Benson, Greenhut, and Norman (1990).
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the pricing scheme into one with multiple basing points. My model allows for this pos-
sibility. In the example above with three production sites, suppose production at site C
grew sufficiently large to mimic constant marginal costs, i.e. the number of site C firms
approached infinity, NC → ∞. The economy would then have two basing points, sites
A and C, with site B charging either the site A or site C delivered price depending on
the consumer’s location.
3.5 Circular Extension
Consider a circular economy with radius R = 1 and denote locations by their polar coor-
dinates (r, φ). The economy is populated by identical consumers distributed uniformly
over the circle, each having inelastic demand x. Production of the consumption good
is produced at two sites, A and B. Site A is situated at the center of the circle, A=0,
and site B is a ring located at some radius between site A and the border of the circle,
B = {(rB, φB)}φB∈[0,2pi], where rB ∈ (A, 1). Locations at site B are then identified
by their angle φB. At site A, NA > 1 firms face equal and constant marginal costs,
while locations at site B, {NφB}φB∈[0,2pi] firms face increasing marginal costs. Per unit
transportation costs vary linearly with distance from the purchasing site,
τ((r, φ), A) = τr, ∀r ∈ [0, 1],
τ((r, φ), (rB, φb)) = τ
(
r2 + r2B − 2rrB cos(φ, φb)
) 1
2 ,∀r ∈ [0, 1], b ∈ B.
Under Bertrand competition, profits for a firm at site A, a ∈ {1, ..., NA}, are
pia =
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
0
[pa(r, φ)− τr] qa(r, φ)dφdr − CA(Qa),
where pa(r, φ) is the mill price firm a charges to location (r, φ), qa(r, φ) is the quantity
firm a sells to location (r, φ), and CA(·) is the cost of producing Qa =
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
0 qa(r, φ)dφdr
units of the consumption good at site A. Similarly, profits for a firm at site B, (b, φb),
b ∈ {1, ..., Nφb}, are
pib =
∫ 1
0
∫ 2pi
0
[
pb(r, φ)− τ
(
r2 + r2B − 2rrB cos(φ, φb)
) 1
2
]
qb(r, φ)dφdr − CB(Qb).
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Define the delivered price offered to location r to be the sum of the mill price charged
to location r and the cost of transportation to location r,
pˆa(r, φ) = pa(r) + τr
pˆb(r, φ) = pb(r, φ) + τ
(
r2 + r2B − 2rrB cos(φ, φb)
) 1
2 ,
then the quantity demanded at location r from a site A firm is
qa(r, φ) =

0 if ∃a′ s.t pˆa(r, φ) > pˆa′(r, φ) or ∃b s.t pˆa(r, φ) > pˆb(r, φ)
x
NA
if pˆa(r, φ) = pˆa′(r, φ),∀a′ and pˆa(r, φ) < pˆb(r),∀b
x if pˆa(r, φ) < pˆa′(r, φ),∀a′ and pˆa(r, φ) < pˆb(r, φ), ∀b.
and from a site B firm
qb(r, φ) =

0 if ∃b′ s.t pˆb(r, φ) > pˆb′(r, φ) or ∃a s.t pˆb(r, φ) > pˆa(r, φ)
x
NB
if pˆb(r, φ) = pˆb′(r, φ),∀b′ and pˆb(r, φ) ≤ pˆa(r, φ),∀a
x if pˆb(r, φ) < pˆb′(r, φ),∀b′ and pˆb(r, φ) ≤ pˆa(r, φ),∀a.
Definition. An equilibrium is a set of delivered prices {pˆ∗a, pˆ∗b} = {pˆ∗a(r, φ), pˆ∗b(r, φ)}r∈[0,1],φ∈[0.2pi]
and quantities {q∗a, q∗b} = {q∗a(r, φ), q∗b (r, φ)}r∈[0,1],φ∈[0,2pi], a ∈ {1, ..., NA}, b ∈ {1, ..., NφB}φB∈[0,2pi],
s.t.
1. A firm, s ∈ {1, ..., NS}, at site S ∈ {A, φB}, chooses prices, pˆs, to maximize profits,
given prices of other firms, pˆ∗−s, i.e.
pis(pˆ∗s; pˆ
∗
−s) ≥ pis(pˆs; pˆ∗−s)
2. No arbitrage: The prices of a firm, s ∈ {1, ..., NS}, at site S ∈ {A, φB} satisfy
pˆ∗s(r) ≤ pˆ∗s(r′) + τ
(
r2 + r′2 − 2rr′ cos(φ, φ′)) 12 , ∀r, r′ ∈ [0, 1], φ, φ′ ∈ [0, 2pi].
3. Markets clear:
NA∑
a
q∗a(r, φ) +
∫ 2pi
0
NφB∑
b
q∗b (r, φ)dφB = x, ∀r ∈ [0, 1], φ ∈ [0, 2pi].
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The following lemma is analogous to lemma 1. It shows that under basing-point
pricing firms at site B will satisfy all demand outward from the center along their ray,
φb, before selling inward toward site A or along any other ray.
Lemma 2. Under basing-point pricing, firms at site B, more specifically located at
(rB, φb), strictly prefer to sell to any point outward from the center along their ray,
{(r, φb)}r∈[rB ,1], over selling to any point inward toward the center, {(r, φb)}r∈[0,rB), or
along any other ray, {(r, φ)}r∈[0,1],φ∈[0,2pi]\φb .
Proof. The difference in transportation costs between site A and site B of delivering to
location (r, φ) is
τ((r, φ), A)−τ((r, φ), (rB, φb)) =

τr − τ(rB − r) = 2τr − τrB if r < B and φ = φb
τr − τ(r − rB) = τrB if r ≥ B and φ = φb
τr − τ (r2 + r2B − 2rrB cos(φ, φb)) 12 if φ 6= φb
For any r < rB, 2r − rB < rB, that is, the difference in transportation costs between
site A and site (rB, φb) of delivering to location (r, φb) is greater outward away from site
A. Also, by the triangle inequality, τ
(
r2 + r2B − 2rrB cos(φ, φb)
) 1
2 > τ(r − rB), hence,
τrB > τr − τ
(
r2 + r2B − 2rrB cos(φ, φb)
) 1
2 . That is, the difference in transportation
costs between site A and site (rB, φb) of delivering to any location (r, φ), φ 6= φb is
smaller than for any location (r, φb), r ∈ [rB, 1]. Therefore, under basing-point pricing,
the marginal revenue of selling to locations outward from the center along its own ray
is greater than marginal revenue of selling inward toward the center or any point along
another ray. 
I now state the analogous basing-point pricing result for the circular model. The
proof is the same as the proving the linear case individually for each ray φb ∈ [0, 2pi].
Proposition 3. Suppose CB(·) is a continuous function s.t. CB(0) = 0, C ′B(·) ≥ 0, and
C ′′0 (·) > 0. If
C ′B
(∫ 1
rB
qB(r, φb)dr
)
≥ τrB, ∀φb ∈ [0, 2pi]
then ∂pˆ
∗
A(r,φ)
∂r =
∂pˆ∗b (r,φ)
∂r = τ , ∀r ∈ [0, 1], φ ∈ [0, 2pi].
An interesting implication of the circular model is that if basing-point pricing breaks
down in some markets, it need not break down industry-wide. One way to think of this
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more intuitively is to reconsider the unit line model with the line extended to the left of
the basing point, site A, with its own production site, call it site C. Due to transportation
costs and with site A in the middle, firms at site B and C cannot compete directly with
each other. Since site B and C are separated, the behavior of firms at site C does not
affect site B firms and vice versa. Therefore, a breakdown of basing-point pricing to
the left of the basing point does not preclude basing-point pricing to the right of the
basing-point. The following proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 4. Suppose that ∃!φb ∈ [0, 2pi] s.t.
C ′B
(∫ 1
rB
qB(r, φb)dr
)
< τrB.
Then there ∃θ < pi s.t. ∀φ ∈ [0, 2pi]\[φb + θ, φb − θ], ∂pˆ
∗
A(r,φ)
∂r =
∂pˆ∗b (r,φ)
∂r = τ , ∀r ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. As in the unit line model, the site B firms at φb will choose to sell inwards
toward site A, but with the additional dimension, they could also sell to adjacent rays.
In fact, firms at (rB, φb) would be indifferent between selling to consumers at (rB, φb),
rB ∈
[
rB
2 , rB
)
or to consumers at any location (r, φ) s.t. the difference in the distance
from site A and (rB, φb) is 2rB − rB. That is, competition among firms at (rB, φb) will
spill over into adjacent rays, potentially putting downward pressure on the prices at
these locations.
Denote the distance between two polar coordinates as
4((r1, φ1), (r2, φ2)) =
(
r21 + r
2
2 − 2r1r2 cos(φ1, φ2)
) 1
2 ,
and define θ < pi s.t.
4((1, φb + θ), A)−4((1, φb + θ), (rB, φb)) = 0.
That is, site (rB, φb) is the same distance from (1, φb+θ) as site A. Thus, at the basing-
point price, the marginal revenue of site (rB, φb) firms of selling to (1, φb + θ) would be
zero.
Therefore, by symmetry, φ ∈ [φb−θ, φb+θ] are the bounds within which competition
from site (rB, φb) can drive down prices. That is, the breakdown in basing-point pricing
is confined within these radial markets and basing-point pricing will prevail in all radial
markets φ ∈ [0, 2pi]\[φb + θ, φb − θ]. 
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3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented a theory of basing-point pricing emerging from Bertrand
competition at all production sites. When firms located outside of the basing point site
face sufficiently increasing marginal costs (or sufficiently high quantity demand), these
firms will compete against the basing point instead of amongst each other. Then, under
Bertrand competition, non-basing point firms match the delivered price of firms at the
basing point resulting in a basing-point pricing system.
This model has several attractive features not fully embodied by other models of non-
collusive basing-point pricing. First, this model allows cross-hauling to arise without
imposing economies in long-haul transportation or product heterogeneity. Second, the
basing-point pricing result does not break down with the addition of non-basing point
production sites and is easily extended to account for multiple non-basing points. Third,
if production at a non-basing point site grows sufficiently large, that site would itself
become an additional basing point. Finally, I have extended the model from the typical
unit line setting to a circular environment, which allows for some firms to follow basing-
point pricing, while others do not.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Multiple Levels of Nests
Our technique can be extended to handle multiple levels of nests for further flexibility.
Lets begin by deriving the model with two levels. That is, products can be categorized
(or grouped) into mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets c1 ∈ C1 ∪ {0} and products
within each set c1 can be further categorized into mutually exclusive and exhaustive
subsets c2 ∈ C2(c1). Verboven (1996) shows that (local) market shares can be written
as,
pi`j = Pr`{ c1 } · Pr`{ c2 | c1 } · Pr`{ j | c2, c1 } = pi`c1pi`c2|c1pi`j|c2c1
=
exp{I`c1}
1 + exp{I`c1}
· exp{I`c2c1/(1− λ1)}
exp{I`c1/(1− λ1)}
· exp{δ`j/(1− λ2)}
exp{I`c2c1/(1− λ2)}
,
where
I`c1 = (1− λ1) log
 ∑
c2∈C2(c1)
exp
{
I`c2c1
1− λ1
}
I`c2c1 = (1− λ2) log
∑
j∈c2
exp
{
δj + η`j
1− λ2
} .
79
80
Define
D`c2 =
∑
j∈c2
exp
{
δj + η`j
1− λ2
}
D`c1 =
∑
c2∈C2(c1)
D
1−λ2
1−λ1
`c2
,
then we can rewrite
I`c1 = (1− λ1) log(D`c1)
I`c2c1 = (1− λ2) log(D`c2)
and we have
pi`c1 =
D1−λ1`c1
1 +
∑
c1∈C1 D
1−λ1
`c1
pi`c2|c1 =
D
(1−λ2)/(1−λ1)
`c2
D`c1
pi`j|c2,c1 =
exp{(δj + η`j)/(1− λ2)}
D`c2
.
Proposition 3 (Nested Logit - Two Levels). For any set of {η`}L`=1 the market share
inversion takes the following analytic form, ∀j ∈ J ,
δj = (1− λ2)
(
log (pij)− log
(∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c1pi`c2|c1pi
1−λ1
1−λ2
`c2|c1
(
pi`c1
pi`0
) 1
1−λ2
exp
{
η`j
1− λ2
}))
.
(A.1)
Proof. By Bayes rule
pij(η`; δ, λ) = Pr`{ c1 } · Pr`{ c2 | c1 } · Pr`{ j | c2, c1 }
= pi`c1 · pi`c2|c1 ·
exp{(δj + η`j)/(1− λ2)}
D`c2
,
Aggregated choice probabilities are then
pij =
L∑
`=1
ω`pij(η`; δ, λ) =
L∑
`=1
ω`pi`c1pi`c2|c1
exp{(δj + η`j)/(1− λ2)}
D`c2
.
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From the equation for pi`c2|c1 , we have that
D`c2 =
(
pi`c2|c1D`c1
) 1−λ1
1−λ2 .
Additionally, we normalize the utility of the outside good – both in terms of product
characteristics as well as the unobserved taste preference across locations. This means
the probability of choosing the outside good at location ` is equal to
pi`0 =
1
1 +
∑
c1∈C1 D
1−λ1
`c1
.
Combining this with the equation for pi`c1 implies
D`c1 =
(
pi`c1
pi`0
) 1
1−λ1
.
We then have that,
D`c2 = pi
1−λ1
1−λ2
`c2|c1
(
pi`c1
pi`0
) 1
1−λ2
.
Plugging into the aggregate choice probabilities, gives
pij =
∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c1pi`c2|c1pi
1−λ1
1−λ2
`c2|c1
(
pi`c1
pi`0
) 1
1−λ2
exp
{
δj + η`j
1− λ2
}
= exp
{
δj
1− λ2
}∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c1pi`c2|c1pi
1−λ1
1−λ2
`c2|c1
(
pi`c1
pi`0
) 1
1−λ2
exp
{
η`j
1− λ2
}
Finally, taking logs we have our inversion:
log (pij) =
δj
1− λ2 + log
(∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c1pi`c2|c1pi
1−λ1
1−λ2
`c2|c1
(
pi`c1
pi`0
) 1
1−λ2
exp
{
η`j
1− λ2
})
or
δj = (1− λ2)
(
log (pij)− log
(∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c1pi`c2|c1pi
1−λ1
1−λ2
`c2|c1
(
pi`c1
pi`0
) 1
1−λ2
exp
{
η`j
1− λ2
}))

Using similar logic, it is straightforward to derive the following result for an arbitrary
number of nests, N :
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Proposition 4 (Nested Logit - N Levels). For any set of {η`}L`=1 the market share
inversion takes the following analytic form, ∀j ∈ J ,
δj =(1− λN )
(
log (pij)
− log
(∑
`∈L
ω`pi`c1
(
N∑
n=2
pi`cn|c1···cn−1pi
1−λn−1
1−λN
`cn|c1···cn−1
)(
pi`c1
pi`0
) 1
1−λN
exp
{
η`j
1− λN
}))
.
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Localization in Footwear Retail
In addition to the retail data, we collect a snapshot of shoe availability for Macy’s and
Payless ShoeSource during August and September of 2014. We first collected all the
shoe SKUs each retailer sold, and then for each SKU, we used the firm’s “check in
stores” web feature to see if the product was currently available. The firms’ websites do
not list how many shoes are in stock, just whether a shoe is available or not. Since each
query was for a specific shoe size, we then aggregate across all sizes to have a measure of
product availability. If across-market consumer demand heterogeneity is as important
as we claim, we would expect to see brick-and-mortar retailing chains stocking different
products at different locations. Assortment data from Macy’s and Payless provide clear
evidence of this.
Table B.1: Summary of Brick-and-Mortar Data
Macy’s Payless Shoes
Number of stores 649 3,141
Number of products 7,844 1,430
Percent online exclusive 34.8% 19.2%
Avg. assortment size 624.9 513.0
(299.3) (58.4)
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Table B.1 presents summary information on Macy’s and Payless’ assortments. In
September 2014, we observe 7,844 different styles available at Macys.com. About 35%
of which are online exclusives, making just over 5,000 shoes available at least one of 649
physical locations. At Payless.com, we observe 1,430 distinct styles, with about 19%
being online exclusives. Average in-store assortment sizes are similar across retail chains
- 624.9 and 513 for Macy’s and Payless, respectively. However, there is much greater
variance in Macy’s store size. Figure B.1 highlights these differences in the form of
histograms of the assortment sizes at Macy’s and Payless locations. Unsurprisingly, we
find that the stores with larger assortments tend to be located around larger population
centers.
(a) Macy’s (b) Payless Shoes
Figure B.1: Shoe Assortment Size Distributions Across Retail Chains
We want to measure how assortments vary by store. Figure B.2 graphs the percent-
age of locations carrying a shoe style for Macy’s and Payless. That is, we present a
histogram of shoe presence across stores of the chain. If all shoes were available at all
stores, the density would collapse at 1 (100%). The left panels within a chain plots the
density for all shoes, whereas the right panel excludes online only shoes. For Macy’s
we can see that the vast majority of products are sold at only a few stores; that is, the
density is concentrated primarily to the left. The Payless Shoes distribution is more
bimodal, at a few stores and at almost all stores. In recent years, Macy’s has made a
concerted effort to better localize their product assortments through a program called
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“My Macy’s.”1 The strikingly low prevalence of products across stores is likely re-
flective of this program. Payless, on the other hand, produces and partners with other
brands to provide exclusive products for its retail chain. The bimodal distribution for
Payless may be reflective of these partnerships.
(a) Macy’s (b) Payless
Figure B.2: Footwear Prevalence Across Stores
Finally, we want to measure how assortments change moving away from a particular
store. To calculate this measure, we begin by taking the network of stores and create
all possible links. Then for each pair of stores with assortment sets (A,B), we calculate
Assortment Overlap =
# (A ∩B)
min {#A,#B}
This measure is bounded between zero and one. We use the minimum cardinality,
rather than the cardinality of the union, because we want this measure to capture
differences in the composition of each store’s inventory, not differences in assortment
size. To further, isolate differences in variety from differences in assortment size we
directly compare only locations with similar sizes. Figure B.3 plots this exercise for
Macy’s and Payless as a function of distance between stores A and B.
We see can that the assortment overlap has a decreasing relationship with distance,
which suggests these retailers are localizing their product assortments. We also, note
that as distance approaches zero, assortment overlap does not converge to 1. This is
1 https://www.macysinc.com/macys/m.o.m.-strategies/default.aspx
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(a) Macy’s (b) Payless
Figure B.3: Assortment Overlap by Distance
likely reflective of a strategy to increase variety within a geographic area.
B.2 An Empirical Bayesian Estimator of Shares
As mentioned in the Data section, our data exhibits a high percentage of zero observa-
tions. To account for this we implement a new procedure proposed by Gandhi, Lu, and
Shi (2014). This estimator is motivated by a Laplace transformation of the empirical
shares
slpj =
M · sj + 1
M + J + 1
.
Note using that slpj results in a consistent estimator of δ as the market size M →∞ as
long as sj
p→ pij . However, instead of simply adding a sale to each product, they “propose
an optimal transformation that minimizes a tight upper bound of the asymptotic mean
squared error of the resulting β estimator.”
The key is to back out the conditional distribution of choice probabilities, pit, given
empirical shares and market size, (s,M). Denote this condition distribution Fpi|s,M .
According to Bayes rule
Fpi|s,M (p|s,M) =
∫
x≤p fs|pi,M (s|x,M)dFpi|M,J(x|M,J)∫
x fs|pi,M (s|x,M)dFpi|M,J(x|M,J)
.
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Thus, Fpi|s,M can be estimated if the following two distributions are known or can be
estimated:
1. Fs|pi,M : the conditional distribution of s given (pi,M);
2. Fpi|M,J : the conditional distribution of pi given (M,J).
Fs|pi,M is known from observed sales: M · s is drawn from a multinomial distribution
with parameters (pi,M),
M · s ∼MN(pi,M). (B.1)
Fpi|M,J is not generally known and must be inferred. Gandhi, Lu, and Shi (2014) note
that sales can often be described by Zipf’s law, which, citing Chen (1980), can be
generated if pi/(1− pi0) follows a Dirichlet distribution. It is then assumed that
pi
(1− pi0)
∣∣∣∣J,M, pi0 ∼ Dir(ϑ1J), (B.2)
for an unknown parameter ϑ.
Equations B.1 and B.2 then imply
s
(1− s0)
∣∣∣∣J,M, s0 ∼ DCM(ϑ1J ,M(1− s0)),
where DCM(·) denotes a Dirichlet compound multinomial distribution. ϑ can the be
estimated by maximum likelihood, since J,M, s0 are observed. This estimator can be
interpreted as an empirical Bayesian estimator of the choice probabilities pi, with a
Dirichlet prior and multinomial likelihood,
F pi
1−s0 |s,M
∼ Dir(ϑ+M · s).
For any random vector X = (X1, ..., XJ) ∼ Dir(ϑ),
E [log(xj)] = ψ(ϑj)− ψ(ϑ′1dϑ),
Thus,
E
[
log
(
pij
1− s0
)]
= E [log (pij)]− E [log (1− s0)]
= ψ(ϑ+M · sj)− ψ((ϑ+M · s)′1dϑ),
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which implies
log(pˆij)− log(pˆi0) = E [log (pij)]− E [log (pi0)]
= ψ(ϑ+M · sj)− ψ(M · s0).
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B.3 Additional Tables and Figures
Figure B.4: Sales Share of a Popular Brand Across Zip3s
